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 The design of incentive compensation plans is critical to a company’s success.  
This study develops and validates a theoretical model to examine how incentive contract 
framing affects effort. This study uses an experiment to observe the effect of the 
manipulation of incentive contract frame and the presence or absence of principal 
discretion in performance evaluation on effort. The results of the experiment show that 
when principal discretion in performance evaluation is absent, penalty contracts induce 
greater effort than bonus contracts. The results of the experiment also demonstrate that 
the interaction of principal discretion in performance evaluation and contract frame 
influences how agents view the perceived fairness of their incentive contract. 
Specifically, principal discretion in performance evaluation increases perceived fairness 
under a penalty contract but not under a bonus contract. This study also extends prior 
research by documenting that perceived fairness explains how incentive contract frame 
affects trust and effort.   
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 Chapter Overview 
The first chapter is structured as follows:  Section 1.2 discusses incentive contract 
framing and Section 1.3 introduces principal discretion in agent performance evaluation.  
Section 1.4 describes this dissertation’s contributions.  
 Incentive Contract Framing 
The design of incentive compensation plans is critical to a company’s success. An 
incentive contract can be framed as either a bonus that rewards agents for achieving 
certain performance goals or as a penalty that decreases compensation if agents fail to 
meet performance goals.1 The effects of bonuses and penalties on managers’ effort 
remains unclear because prior research has found mixed results.   
Conventional economic theory suggests that when two contracts are economically 
equivalent, agents should be indifferent when choosing between them.  “Economically 
equivalent” means the monetary payoff is the same whether the firm frames the contract 
as a bonus or a penalty.  For example, a bonus contract that pays a salary of $10,000 and 
a bonus of $1,000 if the performance target is reached is equivalent to a penalty contract 
that pays a salary of $11,000 and a penalty of $1,000 if the performance target is not 
achieved.  The two contracts are economically equivalent because both contracts pay 
                                                 
1 Although bonus contracts are more common than penalty contracts, interest in and use of contracts that 
include elements of both penalties and bonuses or “bonus-malus” contracts” is becoming more common.  
The implementation of bonus-malus contracts is increasing as a result of “clawback provisions” that target 
excessive CEO compensation. For example, UBS has used a bonus-malus structure for all executive cash 
awards since 2009 (Christ et al. 2012).   
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$11,000 if the performance target is attained and $10,000 if the performance target is not 
achieved.   
Research shows that the framing of incentive contracts can change agents’ 
preferences.  Luft (1994) studied the role of decision-framing on preferences for bonus 
and penalty contracts and found that agents preferred bonus contracts to economically 
equivalent penalty contracts. Luft (1994) suggests that agents preferred bonus contracts 
due to loss aversion, which refers to the idea that people tend to be more sensitive to 
losses than gains (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  Agent preference for bonus contracts is 
also consistent with what is observed in practice where bonus contracts are more 
prevalent than penalty contracts (Christ et al. 2012; Frederickson and Waller 2005; 
Hannan et al. 2005; Luft 1994).   
In a contract setting where the contract specifies the payout for each possible 
outcome, penalty contracts induce more effort than bonus contracts (Hannan et al. 2005). 
Hannan et al. (2005) found that even though agents preferred bonus contracts to penalty 
contracts, agent effort was higher under a penalty contract than an economically 
equivalent bonus contract.  Using the same explanation as Luft (1994), Hannan et al. 
(2005) concludes that loss aversion caused agents to expend more effort under the 
penalty contract than under the bonus contract.  Agents were more averse to paying a 
penalty than not receiving a bonus so they chose a higher effort level under the penalty 
contract to avoid paying the penalty (Hannan et al. 2005).   
Hannan et al. (2005) call for additional research to understand the full range of 
costs and benefits associated with each type of contract.  Because agent effort was higher 
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under penalty contracts, offering a bonus contract gives up the benefit of this increased 
effort.  Therefore, it is no longer clear that offering a bonus contract maximizes firm 
profit (Hannan et al. 2005).  A more comprehensive explanation is also needed to better 
understand the conditions under which firms should use bonus contracts versus penalty 
contracts.  The figure below illustrates the Hannan et al. (2005) model: 
Figure 1: Hannan et al. (2005) Model 
 
 Christ et al. (2012) examined the effect of contract framing on effort in a contract 
setting with principal discretion.  A contract setting with principal discretion allows 
principals to use their discretion to determine agent pay (Christ et al. 2012).  Christ et al. 
(2012) found that when contracts included principal discretion, agent effort on a 
subsequent task that was not under a contract was greater under bonus contracts relative 





 The figure below illustrates the Christ et al. (2012) model: 
Figure 2: Christ et al. (2012) Model 
 
 
 It is unclear whether and how the Hannan et al. (2005) and the Christ et al. (2012) 
models fit together. Christ et al. (2012) call for additional research to analyze the various 
mechanisms through which contract framing may influence agent behavior.  Christ et al. 
(2012) suggest that future research examine when the effect of one mechanism might 
outweigh the others and when managers should implement a bonus versus a penalty 
contract. Understanding how the models fit together will not only improve principals’ use 
of contract framing but will also help principals to maximize firm profit (Hannan et al. 




 Principal Discretion in Agent Performance Evaluation 
  Prior literature on contract framing assumes a contract setting without principal 
discretion. A contract setting without principal discretion details the duties of principals 
to provide compensation for each potential future outcome (Christ et al. 2012).  In 
practice, however, most contracts allow principals to use their discretion to pay agents.  
Incentive contracts with principal discretion are more common than incentive contracts 
without principal discretion (Prendergast 1999; Bol 2008).  
 Principal discretion in agent performance evaluation means that principals use 
subjective judgment to assess agent performance. Principal discretion may be based on 
personal impressions, feelings and options, rather than on external facts (Bol 2008).  By 
definition, the correctness of principal discretion cannot be determined by a third party.   
 Principal discretion in agent performance evaluation is commonly introduced with 
the use of ex post discretional adjustments based on factors other than the performance 
measures specified ex ante (Gibbs et al. 2004; Bol 2008).  Other ways of introducing 
principal discretion are by using subjective performance measures and by allowing for ex 
post flexibility in the weighting of objective performance measures (Bol 2008).  Principal 
discretion in agent performance evaluation falls onto a continuum.  Principals who allow 
for ex post adjustments to objective performance measures may use less discretion than 
principals who combine all three types of discretion.  The type and amount of principal 
discretion depends on the contracting problem (Hoppe and Moers 2011).   
 Most research on principal discretion is based on agency theory.  The main 
purpose of principal-agent models is to describe the “optimal contract” (Bol 2008).  In 
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most situations, agents have better information than principals because complete 
observation of agent actions is not possible.  To address this problem, principals may link 
agent pay to performance.  However, agents must bear risk due to imperfect performance 
measures.  The optimal contract balances the need to motivate unobservable agent effort 
with the need to minimize the risk to agents (Bol 2008).   
  Principal discretion compensates for imperfect performance measures such as 
objective performance measures, which can be noisy.  Objective measures do not account 
for all dimensions of agent effort and can be contaminated by uncontrollable events (Bol 
2008).  The use of discretion improves contracting (Homstron and Milgrom 1991; Budde 
2007) and allows principals to use all relevant information known at the time of the agent 
performance evaluation instead of the limited information available from objective 
measures.  
  However, the costs of principal discretion must be considered along with its 
benefits.  The biggest problem with principal discretion is that discretion allows principal 
self-interest to bias agent evaluations (Prendergast and Topel 1993; Bol 2008; Bol 2011).  
Because contracts with principal discretion are not legally enforceable, principals may 
even renege on promises to pay agents.  The possibility of reneging causes agents to 
withhold effort out of concern that their effort will not be rewarded (Bol 2008).     
 Principal discretion may also lead to inaccurate assessments (Bol 2008).  
Inaccurate assessments can lead to lower productivity because agents will not increase 
their effort when they fear that their effort will not be rewarded. Inaccuracies blur the link 
between pay and performance which then decreases the effectiveness of the incentive 
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plan.  Bol (2008) showed a negative relationship between rating inaccuracies and agent 
incentives and that centrality bias negatively impacts agent performance. Centrality bias 
is the tendency to compress performance ratings, which results in less variance in ratings 
than is justified by variance in performance (Bol 2011).  
 Principal discretion also introduces uncertainty about which measures will be 
used to assess performance.  This can lead to confusion about how agents can improve 
performance.  Agents will not be motivated to increase effort unless they understand how 
performance improvements can lead to increased reward.  Ittner et al. (2003) examined 
the introduction of a compensation plan with principal discretion.  They found that 
discretion in the new plan led agents to complain about the uncertainty in the criteria used 
to determine rewards.   
Prior literature on principal discretion in agent performance evaluation focuses on 
environmental conditions when principal discretion is more common (Hoppe and Moers 
2009; Murphy and Oyer 2003) and the specific ways that principal discretion is used in 
practice (Bol et al. 2015; Bol and Smith 2011; Hoppe and Moers 2009; Ittner et al. 2003).  
Few studies, however, examine the effects of principal discretion on agents (Gibbs et al. 
2004; Bol 2008) with the exception of Bol (2008), which shows that principal discretion 
negatively impacts agent performance due to centrality bias.       
 This Study 
 This study develops and validates a theoretical model of the effects of incentive 
contract framing on agent effort based on the Hannan et al. (2005) and Christ et al. (2012) 
models.  The study also uses the model to examine whether and how principal discretion 
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in agent performance evaluation interacts with incentive contract framing. The effect of 
principal discretion in agent performance evaluation is unclear because the effect of 
principal discretion depends on the degree to which agents interpret its use as a signal of 
trust.  The study hypothesizes that the interaction of principal discretion in agent 
performance evaluation and incentive contract framing has an asymmetric effect on agent 
effort.  More specifically, principal discretion in agent performance evaluation and 
incentive contract framing increases agent effort under bonus contracts but decreases 
agent effort under penalty contracts.      
 The two independent variables, incentive contract frame and principal discretion 
in agent performance evaluation, are each manipulated at two levels.  Contract frame is 
manipulated with either a positively framed contract that rewarded agents for meeting or 
exceeding the performance target or a negatively framed contract that penalized agents 
for failing to meet the performance target.  The study maintained monetary equivalence 
across conditions to isolate the framing effects.  Principal discretion in agent performance 
evaluation is manipulated by either allowing or not allowing principals to adjust the 
performance target that determined whether agents received the reward or paid the 
penalty.  This manipulation is consistent with practice where firms allow principals to 
make ex post discretionary adjustments to performance measures in incentive contracting 
(Bol 2008).   
 The study examines the effect of incentive contract framing and principal 
discretion in agent performance evaluation on effort using a computer-based experiment 
with two tasks adapted from Christ et al. (2012).  The first task, the task under contract, 
manipulates both independent variables and uses performance-based pay as defined by 
9 
 
the experimental condition. The study’s second task, the task not under contract, is not 
governed by an incentive contract and measures the trust effect from the first task.  The 
second task allows the principal to have complete discretion over the agent’s pay. The 
manipulation of incentive contract frame and principal discretion in the first task is 
expected to affect the results in the second task. 
 The two primary dependent variables are agent effort on the task under contract 
(the first task) and agent effort on the task not under contract (the second task).   Agent 
effort is represented by the amount of points agents choose to invest in each task. This 
costly choice meets the definition of effort found in prior research (Fehr et al. 1993). The 
study also adds in the other factors from the previous two models for the supplemental 
analysis: perceived fairness and expected disappointment from Hannan et al. (2005) and 
perceived intrusion, perceived autonomy, signal of questioning competence, signal of 
questioning integrity, perceived trust, and reciprocal trust from Christ et al. (2012).  The 
study measures these items using agents’ responses to questions in the experimental 
instrument. 
 The combined model suggests that the interaction of principal discretion in agent 
performance evaluation with incentive contract frame will decrease (increase) effort 
under a penalty (bonus) contract frame.  The use of the penalty (bonus) contract frame 
with principal discretion will lead to higher (lower) levels of expected disappointment 
and perceived intrusion and lower (higher) levels of perceived fairness and perceived 
autonomy than the use of the penalty (bonus) contract frame without principal discretion. 
These effects will lead to lower (higher) levels of trust, effort and performance under the 
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penalty (bonus) contract frame with principal discretion than under the penalty (bonus) 
contract frame without principal discretion. 
    Results do not support these predictions.  The use of the penalty (bonus) contract 
frame with principal discretion did not decrease (increase) effort.  The use of the penalty 
contract (bonus) contract frame with principal discretion did not lead to significantly 
higher (lower) levels of expected disappointment, perceived intrusion and perceived loss 
of autonomy and lower (higher) levels of perceived fairness than the use of the penalty 
(bonus) contract frame without principal discretion. Therefore, there were no significant 
differences in levels of trust, effort and performance between the penalty (bonus) contract 
frame with principal discretion and the penalty (bonus) contract frame without principal 
discretion.     
 This study, however, finds an interaction between principal discretion and 
contract frame.  Specifically, principal discretion increases perceived fairness under a 
penalty contract frame but not under a bonus contract frame.  The results also show that 
when a penalty contract includes principal discretion, there is no significant difference in 
perceived fairness between a bonus contract and a penalty contract.   
This study extends prior research by showing that perceived fairness brings 
together the Hannan et al. (2005) and Christ et al. (2012) models.  Similar to Hannan et 
al. (2005), this study finds that effort was greater under a penalty contract than under a 
bonus contract in a setting without discretion. Also, similar to Christ et al. (2012), this 
study shows that bonus contracts create a more trusting environment than penalty 
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contracts.  Contrary to prior research, however, this study finds that perceived fairness 
explains how contract frame affects effort and the trust environment. 
This study provides several important contributions to academic literature and 
practice.  First, this study reconciles the theory and findings of Hannan et al. (2005) and 
Christ et al. (2012).  Because prior contract framing studies theorized alternative 
mediating paths, it was unclear how incentive contract framing shapes agent beliefs. By 
bringing together the Hannan et al. (2005) and Christ et al. (2012) models, this study 
helps academics to better understand the underlying mechanisms for how contract 
framing influences agent beliefs.  
 Second, the study extends the principal discretion in compensation contracting 
literature. Prior literature on principal discretion focuses on the benefits and costs of 
principal discretion without examining whether principal discretion changes the effects of 
incentive contract framing.  The results of this study show that principal discretion in 
performance evaluation significantly improves the perceived fairness of penalty 
contracts. 
 Third, this study is the first to analyze whether and how principals’ use of 
discretionary adjustments to performance measures interacts with incentive contract 
framing. Prior literature has just begun to examine the different types of principal 
discretion in incentive contracting (Bol 2008; Hoppe and Moers 2011).  Christ et al. 
(2012) introduces a form of principal discretion that is not based on performance 
measures. However, in practice, principals use discretion to make ex post adjustments to 
performance measures.  Prior literature shows that these two types of principal discretion 
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have different determinants (Bol 2008; Hoppe and Moers 2011).  Therefore, it is 
important to understand whether and how principals’ use of discretionary adjustments to 
performance measures changes the contract framing effects on agent behavior.  
 Fourth, the results of the study are important for managers who design and 
implement incentive contracts. The results of the study suggest that managers who design 
incentive contracts may want to consider both the use of principal discretion in agent 
performance evaluation and contract frame (bonus vs. penalty). The study finds that the 
use of ex post discretionary adjustments to performance measures significantly improves 
the perceived fairness of penalty contracts.   
 The next chapter reviews the relevant contract framing literature with a focus on 
Hannan et al. (2005) and Christ et al. (2012) and the literature that examines principal 
discretion in agent performance evaluation; Chapter 3 develops the hypotheses; Chapter 4 
details the research methods used to test the hypotheses; Chapter 5 presents data analysis 
and the results and Chapter 6 summarizes the results, the study’s limitations and future 




Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 Chapter Overview 
 This chapter presents a brief summary of the background literature which is 
organized into two categories.  Section 2.2 summarizes the literature on the effects of 
incentive contract framing.  This section includes a detailed review of Hannan et al. 
(2005) and Christ et al. (2012).  Section 2.3 looks at both the benefits and costs of 
principal discretion in agent performance evaluation.  Section 2.4 concludes with a 
summary of the chapter. 
 Effects of Incentive Contract Framing  
2.2.1 Framing  
 “Framing” refers to the wording of a task that can describe the judgment or 
decision either in positive or negative terms (Bonner 2008).  Tversky and Kahneman 
(1981) introduced “risky choice” framing with their “Asian disease problem.”  The “risky 
choice” frame asked individuals to make a choice between a risky or riskless alternative.  
Both alternatives were described either in positive or negative terms.  Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981) found a “choice reversal.”  The majority of individuals chose the 
riskless alternative when given the positively framed version of the task but chose the 
risky alternative when given the negatively framed version of the task.  Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981) explained this choice reversal with their theory called “prospect 
theory.”  Prospect theory predicts that individuals are risk averse in choices involving 
gains and risk seeking in choices involving losses (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).   
14 
 
2.2.2 Preference for Bonus Contracts vs. Penalty Contracts  
 In practice, most incentive contracts are framed as bonus contracts rather than 
penalty contracts (Luft 1994; Frederickson and Waller 2005; Hannan et al. 2005; Church 
et al. 2008; Christ et al. 2012; Brink and Rankin 2013).  The first study to investigate this 
topic was Luft (1994).  Using an experiment where participants chose between a contract 
with a flat rate and a series of bonus or penalty incentive contracts, Luft (1994) found that 
individuals preferred bonus contracts to penalty contracts.  The study concluded that 
principals would have to pay agents more to accept a penalty contract than a bonus 
contract. 
 Luft (1994) proposed three possible explanations for the study’s results.  First, 
agents preferred bonus to penalty contracts due to loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979).  Because contracts labeled “bonus” aroused a positive “gain” association and 
contracts labeled “penalty” aroused a negative “loss” association, agents preferred bonus 
contracts.  Second, agents associated nonmonetary payoffs with bonus contracts because 
contracts labeled a “bonus” had connotations of approval and reward. Third, bonus and 
penalty contracts in practice have implicit contract terms: “bonus” implies both a 
guaranteed base amount and an additional future payoff and “penalty” implies that the 
base amount was uncertain without any future benefit (Luft 1994).   
 Frederickson and Waller (2005) supported Luft (1994)’s findings that loss 
aversion caused agents to prefer bonus contracts to penalty contracts.   In an experimental 
setting where principals interacted with agents, Frederickson and Waller (2005) showed 
that agents in the penalty group demanded higher pay than agents in the bonus group.  
The study also found that principals accommodated agents’ loss aversion by increasing 
15 
 
expected agent pay in the penalty group relative to the bonus group (Frederickson and 
Waller 2005).   
 Brink and Rankin (2013) extended Luft (1994) by testing whether risk preference 
and loss aversion justified why agents prefer bonus contracts to penalty contracts. The 
study also contributes to prior literature by examining contracts with combinations of 
bonus, penalty and clawback incentives.   Brink and Rankin (2013) found not only that 
loss aversion and risk preferences explained agents’ preferences for bonus contracts but 
the study also demonstrated that bonus contracts were preferred to contracts framed as 
combinations of bonus and penalty incentives. 
2.2.3 Effect of Contract Framing on Effort in a Contract Setting without Principal 
Discretion 
 Several papers examine the effect of contract framing on effort in a contract 
setting without principal discretion (Hannan et al. 2005; Church et al. 2008; Hossain and 
List 2012).   A contract setting without principal discretion is one that does not allow for 
principal discretion because the contract specifies the financial obligations of principals 
to agents for each potential future outcome.  Consistent with prospect theory’s 
predictions and loss aversion, all three studies showed that penalty-framed contracts 
motivated higher effort than bonus-framed contracts.     
 The purpose of Hannan et al. (2005) was to provide an understanding of whether 
and how factors underlying agents’ preference for bonus contracts affected agent effort.  
Specifically, the study explored the following questions: 1) does agent effort differ under 
economically equivalent contracts framed in bonus versus penalty terms and if so, which 
type of contract results in higher effort and 2) does expected disappointment or perceived 
fairness mediate any effect of contract frame on agent effort (Hannan et al. 2005)?    
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 The underlying tension for the study came from two opposite predictions.  On the 
one hand, the theory of reciprocity predicts that agent effort will be greater under bonus 
contracts than under penalty contracts.  Agents who view bonus contracts as fairer than 
penalty contracts will reciprocate by expending more effort under bonus contracts than 
under penalty contracts (Hannan et al. 2005).   In the study’s post-experimental questions, 
Luft (1994) found that agents preferred bonus contracts to penalty contracts because 
agents viewed bonus contracts as fairer than penalty contracts.   
 On the other hand, loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky 1979) predicts that agent 
effort will be greater under penalty contracts than under bonus contracts.  Loss aversion 
suggests that individuals experience greater disutility from the perceived loss of having to 
pay a penalty than from the perceived foregone gain associated with not receiving an 
equivalent bonus (Hannan et al. 2005).  Agents who expect to experience greater 
disutility will expend more effort to avoid the expected outcome than agents who expect 
to experience less disutility.  Therefore agents under penalty contracts will expend greater 
effort than agents under bonus contracts. 
 Using an experiment, Hannan et al. (2005) assigned participants to either a bonus 
or penalty contract.  The participants’ task was to choose an effort level.  The study also 
asked agents about 1) their degree of expected disappointment about not receiving the 
bonus or having to pay the penalty and 2) the fairness of their contract.  After responding 
to the expected disappointment and fairness questions, participants were given a 
description of the contract used in the other condition and were asked whether they 
preferred the bonus or the penalty contract (Hannan et al. 2005).   
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 The answer to Hannan et al. (2005)’s first research question was that although 
agents preferred bonus contracts, agent effort was significantly greater under penalty 
contracts than under bonus contracts. Due to loss aversion, agents expected to be more 
disappointed about having to pay the penalty than about not receiving the bonus.  The 
greater disappointment resulted in higher agent effort.  Therefore, agent effort was greater 
under penalty contracts than under bonus contracts.    
 The answer to the study’s second research question was that both expected 
disappointment and perceived fairness mediated the effect of contract frame on effort. 
However, the expected disappointment effect was stronger than the perceived fairness 
effect.  The expected disappointment effect was due to loss aversion that made agents 
more averse to having to pay the penalty than foregoing an economically equivalent gain.  
The perceived fairness effect was due to reciprocity which caused agents under bonus 
contracts to choose more effort than agents under penalty contracts because agents 
viewed bonus contracts as fairer than penalty contracts.  
   Using an experiment without principal discretion, Church et al. (2008) examined 
the effect of contract frame on effort for a task that led to higher performance with 
increased effort.  Previous research used a traditional “effort choice” setting that did not 
include performance effects.  Church et al. (2008) also tested whether contract frame 
motivated effort differently in the presence or absence of an effective financial incentive 
for performance.  Church et al. (2008) found that the penalty-framed contract motivated 
higher task performance for agents whose performance fell within the bonus or penalty 
range (i.e. where financial incentives were effective in motivating performance).  
Performance did not differ based on contract frame for agents whose performance 
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resulted in them receiving either the minimum or maximum payment (i.e. where financial 
incentives were not effective in motivating performance).   
 Hossain and List (2012) used a natural field experiment to explore how contract 
framing increased productivity in a high-tech Chinese consumer electronics company.  In 
a contract setting without principal discretion, the study predicted that workers under the 
penalty contract would outperform workers under the bonus contract due to loss aversion.  
Hossain and List (2012) found that workers under the penalty contract significantly 
outperformed workers under the bonus contract.     
2.2.4 Effect of Contract Framing on Effort in a Contract Setting with Principal 
Discretion 
  Christ et al. (2012) investigate whether principal discretion affects effort under 
bonus contracts relative to penalty contracts.  Specifically, the study considered whether 
effort would be greater under bonus contracts than under penalty contracts in a contract 
setting with principal discretion (Christ et al. 2012).  The contract setting allows principal 
discretion because the incentive contract does not govern all tasks for which the agent is 
responsible (Christ et al. 2012).  
 Christ et al. (2012) is important not only because prior literature assumed a 
contract setting without principal discretion (Luft 1994; Hannan et al. 2005; Church et al. 
2008; Hossain and List 2012) but also because most incentive contracts in practice allow 
principals to have discretion over agent compensation (Christ et al. 2012).  In a setting 
with principal discretion, principal opportunism is possible (Fisher et al. 2005).  As a 
result of principal opportunism, agent effort depends on agents’ trust in principals (Christ 
et al. 2012).  If contract frame affects the trust environment, then prior literature 
examining the effect of contract frame on effort is incomplete (Christ et al. 2012).      
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 The study’s experiment manipulated the incentive contract frame as either a 
bonus contract or a penalty contract that governed only one of two tasks. This type of 
setting is common in practice because most incentive contracts do not include all of the 
tasks for which the agent is responsible (Christ et al. 2012).   In the first task, principals 
paid agents for performance based on either a bonus or penalty incentive contract. In the 
second task, principals paid agents based on their discretion rather than an incentive 
contract.  With principal discretion, trust becomes important in determining agent effort 
(Christ et al. 2012). 
 In contrast to a contract setting without principal discretion, agent effort in a 
contract setting with principal discretion was higher under bonus contracts than penalty 
contracts. Christ et al. (2012) found that agent effort was higher because bonus contracts 
created a more trusting environment than penalty contracts.  The positive framing of the 
bonus contract signaled the principal’s trust in the agent.  This signal increased the 
agent’s trust in the principal which led to increased agent effort on the task not governed 
by an incentive contract.      
 Christ et al. (2012) suggest that both contract frame and the use of principal 
discretion are important when examining the effects of incentive contracts.  The results 
also help to explain why bonus contracts are more common than penalty contracts.  
Bonus contracts in a contract setting with principal discretion result in higher agent effort 
than penalty contracts.   
 This section has advanced two theories of incentive contract framing that describe 
the effects of incentive contract framing on agent effort.  First, in a contract setting 
without principal discretion, loss aversion explains why penalty contracts elicit greater 
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agent effort than bonus contracts.  Agents experience greater disutility from the perceived 
loss of having to pay a penalty than from the perceived foregone gain associated with an 
equivalent bonus (Hannan 2005).  Second, in a contract setting with principal discretion, 
the agent’s trust in the principal explains why bonus contracts lead to greater agent effort 
than penalty contracts (Christ et. al. 2012). Agents interpret the terms of a bonus contract 
as a signal of trust which leads to greater effort on tasks not governed by the contract as 
compared to penalty contracts.   
 In practice, most contracts allow principals to use discretion in evaluating agents.  
Therefore, the next section examines both the benefits and costs of principal discretion in 
agent performance evaluation.   
 Principal Discretion in Agent Performance Evaluation 
2.3.1 Benefits of Principal Discretion in Agent Performance Evaluation 
 This section discusses the benefits of introducing principal discretion in agent 
performance evaluation.  The benefits include: 1) the mitigation of distortions in 
incentives 2) agent compensation risk reduction 3) limitation of measure manipulation 4) 
motivation to adapt behavior and 5) reduction of perceived unfairness (Bol 2008).  First, 
principal discretion in agent performance evaluation compensates for inadequate 
objective performance measures.  Objective performance measures can be inadequate 
because objective performance measures cannot account for all dimensions of the agent’s 
job (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991).  Discretion allows principals to include aspects of 
agent performance in the evaluation that are not quantifiable rather than only those 
aspects that are quantifiable.   
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 Several papers have investigated the role of principal discretion in mitigating 
incentive distortions (Bol 2008).  Murphy and Oyer (2003) examined the role of 
discretion in executive incentive contracts.  The study examines the trade-offs firms face 
in choosing between imprecise objective measures of individual performance, more 
accurate but subjective performance measures and broad firm-wide measures.  Using a 
proprietary dataset of executive bonus plans, the study found that discretion was used to 
adjust for imperfect objective performance measures.  Moreover, the study showed that 
objective measures do not adequately capture the value of manager performance.   
 In a study by Gibbs et al. (2005), car dealerships used discretion to reward service 
managers for value-enhancing efforts that were not easily quantified in formula contracts. 
Service jobs were more difficult to measure than sales jobs because service jobs included 
measures such as quality of repairs, timeliness of service and customer satisfaction.  Car 
dealerships found it too costly to include all of these measures in the formula bonus.  
Gibbs et al. (2005) found that using discretion motivated service managers to focus on a 
wider range of value-enhancing tasks rather than on only those tasks that could easily be 
quantified.    
 Gibbs et al. (2009) showed that firms used discretion as a response to weaknesses 
in available objective performance measures.  Their car dealership survey data analyzed 
the incentive system for managers of several car dealerships.  They found that car 
dealerships used incentive systems of multiple performance measures and additional 
discretionary bonuses to adjust for weaknesses in the objective performance measures. 
 Second, principal discretion lowers agent compensation risk (Bol 2008).  
Objective performance measures can be noisy due to factors outside the control of agents.  
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Noisy performance measures require that principals pay a risk premium to risk-averse 
agents.  Principals can use discretionary adjustments to noisy performance measures to 
filter out the compensation effects of the uncontrollable events.   
 Hoppe and Moers (2011) showed that boards of directors used discretionary 
adjustments to address the contracting problem of risk.  Discretionary adjustments were 
“the ex ante option to ex post override a formula (Hoppe and Moers 2011).” Hoppe and 
Moers (2011) used compensation contract data from SEC proxy statements.  Specifically, 
the study found that firms used discretionary adjustments to reduce risk by adjusting for 
uncontrollable events.  The study also found that firms increased their use of 
discretionary bonuses as performance measures became noisier.   
 Using car dealership compensation survey data, Gibbs et al. (2004) examined 
whether principals used discretion in awarding bonuses to reduce risk.  Risk may be due 
to uncontrollable factors such as organizational interdependencies or to uncontrollable 
events that increased the difficulty of performance targets.  They found that the use of 
discretionary bonuses was related to the extent of organizational interdependencies and to 
the difficulty of the formula bonus target.    
 Maas, van Rinsum and Towry (2011) studied the willingness of managers to 
obtain additional costly information to better assess individual contributions to the team. 
They found that because of concerns for fairness and trust reciprocity, managers used 
their discretion to obtain this additional information as the team measure became a 
noisier measure of individual performance. 
 Third, principal discretion reduces measure manipulation (Bol 2008).  Objective 
measures are susceptible to manipulation (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991; Ittner et al. 
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2003).   Because agents know which actions affect objective performance measures, 
agents can use this information to their benefit at the expense of the firm.  Discretion 
allows principals to limit measure manipulation because principals can use their 
discretion to punish agents who attempt to manipulate measures.  Also principals can use 
discretion to make adjustments ex post rather than limit their evaluations to the ex ante 
objective performance measures.  Knowing this, agents have less incentive to manipulate 
objective performance measures.   
 Several papers address the role of principal discretion in reducing measure 
manipulation.  Gibbs et al. (2004) was unable to show that the use of discretion was 
related to the manipulability of the objective measures.  Woods (2012) did not find that 
principals were more likely to adjust downward for unexpectedly high objective 
performance measures the more manipulable the measure.  On the other hand, Gibbs et 
al. (2009) found that car dealerships were more likely to use discretion the more 
manipulable the performance measure.  Gibbs et al. (2009) also showed that car 
dealerships weighted more heavily those measures that had the least amount of 
manipulation.   
 Indjejikian and Matejka (2011) demonstrated that firms relied more on 
performance evaluation that used principal discretion in determining local managers’ 
bonuses when those local managers had greater influence over the design of internal 
accounting systems.  When managers had greater influence over the design of internal 
accounting systems, the managers obtained private information that could be used to the 
managers’ benefit at the expense of the firm.  Principals used their discretion in 
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performance evaluations to protect themselves against agents’ manipulation of 
accounting measures. 
 Fourth, principal discretion motivates adaptive agent behavior (Bol 2008).  A 
basic purpose of incentive contract design is to align agent incentives with the goals of 
the principal.  When new information becomes available after the contract is finalized, 
agent incentives may become distorted.  Discretion allows principals to incorporate this 
new information to restore the alignment of principals’ goals and agents’ incentives.   
Principals can incentivize changes to agent performance with the use of either subjective 
weights or discretionary adjustments to performance measures.   
 Hoppe and Moers (2011) found that boards of directors used subjective weights to 
assure goal congruity in CEO incentive contracts.  The study defined subjective weights 
as the ex ante absence of any formula in a contract.  A congruity problem existed when 
agents’ optimal course of action was difficult to know because of environmental 
unpredictability.  Subjective weights addressed the congruity problem because subjective 
weights allowed principals the flexibility to incorporate any information that was relevant 
at the time of agent performance evaluation rather than only the information that was 
available when the contract was signed. 
 Using car dealership survey data, Gibbs et al. (2009) examined whether 
dealerships weighted performance measures with uncontrollable risk less than 
performance measures with more controllable risk.  Controllable risk was defined as 
environmental uncertainty that agents can react to and uncontrollable risk was defined as 
environmental uncertainty that agents cannot react to (noise).  Gibbs et al. (2009) found 
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that dealerships used discretion to weight more heavily those performance measures with 
controllable risk than performance measures with uncontrollable risk.    
 Bol et al. (2015) showed that principals were less willing to make discretionary 
adjustments to agent performance measures for an uncontrollable event when future 
event likelihood is high than when it is low.  Using an experiment, the study manipulated 
the event likelihood and measured the discretionary adjustment made by the principal.  
The results show that principals used their discretion strategically in order to induce agent 
innovation (Bol et al. 2015).   
 Fifth, principal discretion reduces perceived unfairness (Bol 2008).  The justice 
literature distinguishes two types of fairness:  procedural justice is the fairness of the 
process used to determine an outcome and distributive justice is the fairness of the 
outcome (Folger and Konovsky 1989).  The lack of either type of fairness can decrease 
agent motivation, which can impact agent performance negatively.  Principals can use 
discretion to reduce perceived unfairness by adjusting for uncontrollable effects on 
performance measures.  Bol and Smith (2011) examined whether principals used 
discretion in subjective agent evaluation to adjust for the effects of an uncontrollable 
measure.  The study found that principals used discretion to adjust for the impact of 
uncontrollable events on the objective performance measure.  More specifically, 
principals used discretion to adjust agent performance evaluations upward when the 
uncontrollable factor led to unfavorable outcomes for agents.  However, principals did 
not adjust downward when the uncontrollable factor led to favorable outcomes for agents 
(Bol and Smith 2011).   
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 Principals can also use discretion to reduce perceived unfairness when a high 
level of compensation interdependence exists.  Compensation interdependence exists 
when performance measures and compensation of one agent affects those of other agents 
(Bol et al. 2015).  Bol et al. (2015) examined whether principals would be less likely to 
make discretionary adjustments for a negative uncontrollable event when doing so would 
punish those agents who were unaffected by the negative uncontrollable event.  The study 
found that concerns for fairness reduced principals’ willingness to punish unaffected 
agents.   
2.3.2 Costs of Principal Discretion in Agent Performance Evaluation 
 Although principal discretion in agent performance evaluation has several 
benefits, principal discretion can also be costly.  This section discusses the following 
costs of principal discretion:  1) reneging 2) inaccurate assessments 3) influence activities 
and 4) uncertainty about performance measures (Bol 2008). 
 The first cost of principal discretion is reneging.  Reneging occurs when 
contracted performance is not rewarded (Prendergast 1993).  Principals may not pay 
agents because contracts with performance evaluation subject to principal discretion are 
not legally enforceable.  If agents expect principals not to pay, agents will not provide 
effort.  Therefore, agents’ reneging concerns are costly to the principal. 
 Principals can address agents’ reneging concerns by committing to fixed bonus 
pools (Bol 2008).  When using bonus pools, principals commit ex ante to allocate a 
specified total bonus amount.  Because the total bonus is determined by objective 
measures that are contractible, principals no longer have incentives to renege. Principals 
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then use non-contractible information to allocate the amounts in the bonus pools between 
agents. 
 Baiman and Rajan (1995) used an analytical model to identify the ideal conditions 
under which principals can incorporate this non-contractible information.  Baiman and 
Rajan (1995) showed that as long as the non-contractible information was informative 
about at least one agent, the use of bonus pools resulted in a strict Pareto improvement.  
The size of the pool was determined by an explicit formula ex ante and principals 
committed ex ante to pay the entire amount of the pool.  However, the allocation of the 
pool was left to principal discretion. The use of the non-contractible information 
motivated agents to exert effort.  
 Fisher et al. (2005) used an experiment to provide empirical support for Baiman 
and Rajan’s (1995) model.  Fisher et al. (2005) examined whether principal discretion 
over the size of the total compensation pool and/or the allocation of this pool affected 
opportunism by principals and agents. Giving principals full discretion over both 
decisions reduces agent opportunism but not principal opportunism (Fisher et al. 2005).   
Fisher et al. (2005) found that firm output and agent compensation were greater as long 
as principals had discretion over the allocation of the pool but not the size of the pool. 
 Rajan and Resichelstein (2006) extended Baiman and Rajan (1995) and showed 
that the use of bonus pools involved an additional agency cost relative to the benchmark 
of optimal contracts based on objective information only.  Agents incurred additional risk 
because each agent’s pay depended on the performance of other agents covered by the 
bonus pool (Bol 2008).  Rajan and Reseichelstein (2006) found that this additional 
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agency cost decreased as the precision of subjective information increased or as the 
number of agents increased. 
 Rajan and Reichelstein (2009) studied the structure of optimal bonus pool 
arrangements when bonus pools used both objective and subjective performance 
measures.  The study demonstrated that principals obtained the optimal bonus pool 
arrangement when principals ignored subjective information for all but the lowest 
possible objective outcome.  Also, Rajan and Reichelstein (2009) provided evidence that 
the bonus pool corresponding to the lowest objective outcome was always paid out in full 
to agents unless the subjective metric assumed the worst possible outcome.   
 Ederhof (2010)’s analytical model extended Rajan and Reichelstein (2009) by 
showing that firms were more likely to pay discretionary bonuses when the outcome of 
the contractible measure was either low or high but not when the contractible measure 
was in the middle.  Ederhof (2010) hypothesized that discretionary bonuses disclosed the 
board’s assessment of non-contractible performance measures and that non-contractible 
measures were correlated with contractible measures.  When contractible measures were 
high or low, principals had more certainty about agent performance than when 
contractible measures were in the middle so the additional agency cost of discretionary 
bonuses was lower.      
 The second cost of principal discretion is inaccurate performance assessments.  
Most principals are not the residual claimants of agents’ outputs so principals have little 
incentive to renege.  However, principals can use discretion to serve their self-interests 
which can lead to inaccurate or biased performance assessments (Prendergast and Topel 
1993; Bol 2011).  
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 Many studies show that performance evaluations with principal discretion are 
subject not only to systematic bias but also to bias due to personal attributes of agents 
(Kingsbury 1922, Thorndike 1949, Feldman 1981).  Two well-known systematic biases 
are centrality bias and leniency bias.   Centrality bias refers to the tendency to compress 
performance ratings, and leniency bias refers to the tendency to inflate performance 
ratings (Bol 2011).  Moers (2005) demonstrated that performance measure diversity and 
discretion in performance measurement led to more compressed ratings and to more 
lenient performance ratings.   
 Inaccurate performance evaluations are costly to the principal for three reasons.  
First, inaccuracies in performance evaluations can lead to less productivity because 
inaccuracies weaken the link between pay and performance (Prendergast 1999).  As a 
result, performance evaluation bias reduces incentives for agent effort.  Bol (2011) 
showed that centrality bias decreased agent motivation which decreased agent 
performance.   
 Second, inaccurate assessments are costly to the principal because they can lead 
to favoritism which negatively affects the perceived fairness of the compensation contract 
(Bol 2008).  Favoritism leads to lower perceived procedural justice for other agents.  
Lower perceived procedural justice decreased agent motivation and organizational 
commitment (McFarlin & Sweeney 1992; Prendergast and Topel 1993).   With data from 
a leading international financial services provider, Ittner et al. (2003) demonstrated that 
the use of subjectivity in weighting scorecard measures led agents to complain about 
favoritism in bonus awards.  The perceived unfairness led agents to question the firm’s 
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use of the scorecard for compensation purposes (Ittner et al. 2003).  Eventually the firm 
stopped using the balanced scorecard.   
 Third, inaccurate assessments are costly to the principal because they can lead to 
personnel issues.  Low performing agents may get promoted at the expense of high 
performing agents that may lead other agents who feel discriminated against to resign 
(Bol 2008).   Sebald (2014) demonstrated that agents retaliated when subjective 
assessments were below agent expectations.  In an experiment, agents’ reactions to 
principals’ subjective feedback depended on agents’ self-perception.   
 Four reasons explain why principals tend to assess performance inaccurately.  
First, the use of accompanying performance measures may lead to inaccurate 
assessments.  Moers (2005) demonstrated that the use of multiple objective performance 
measures and the use of subjective performance measures were related to more 
compressed ratings and more lenient ratings.  Bol and Smith (2011) examined how 
principals’ subjective performance evaluations were affected by the level and 
controllability of an objective performance measure on a separate aspect of agent 
performance.  The study found that principals' subjective evaluations were significantly 
higher when the objective level of the other performance measure was relatively high.  
Woods (2012) showed that principals' subjective adjustments to objective performance 
measures were influenced by prior subjective agent evaluations.   
 A second reason for inaccurate assessments is the strength of the principal-agent 
relationship (Bol 2008).  Principals may refrain from giving harsh but accurate 
performance assessments to avoid damaging their relationships with agents.  Using 
incentive plan data from a financial service provider, Bol (2011) found that the strength 
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of agent-principal relationship positively affected centrality bias and leniency bias.  
Specifically, principals gave less compressed and less lenient ratings when the principal -
agent relationship was weaker (Bol 2011).    
 A third reason for inaccurate assessments is high information gathering costs (Bol 
2008).  Assessing performance can be costly to principals because principals must invest 
time to evaluate agents.  To avoid confrontation with agents who may question their 
performance assessments, principals inflate performance ratings (Bernardin et al. 2000).  
Bol (2011) showed that information gathering costs led to centrality bias and leniency 
bias.  
 A fourth reason for inaccurate assessments is the cognitive limitations of 
principals (Bol 2008).  Cognitive limitations may lead to bias as a result of failing to 
make sufficient adjustments. Bailey et al. (2011) demonstrated that principals failed to 
make sufficient adjustments when principals incorporated non-contractible information. 
The study investigated the effect of discretion extent on discretionary bonus allocations 
by using either full discretion (allocation of the entire bonus pool) or partial discretion 
(allocation of some of the bonus pool).  Bailey et al. (2011) found that principals used an 
anchoring approach to allocate discretionary bonuses rather than integrate both 
contractible and non-contractible information into a single comprehensive measure.  With 
full discretion, principals tended to anchor on a subset of information and failed to 
adequately incorporate the non-contractible information (Bailey et al. 2011). The 
principals’ use of an anchoring approach may help to explain principals’ propensity 
toward the halo effect.  The halo effect is a cognitive bias that may occur when 1) 
principals weight one measure of performance higher than another performance measure 
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and 2) positive performance on the favored measure creates a positive halo that affects 
the overall evaluation (Bailey et al. 2011).   
 The third cost of principal discretion is influence activities (Bol 2008).  Agents 
may try to influence principals to increase the likelihood of more favorable assessments. 
Influence activities may take many forms including ingratiation.  Ingratiation is behavior 
designed to increase principals’ liking of agents or to make agents appear friendly to get 
what agents want (Higgins, Judge and Ferris 2003).  Influence activities are costly to 
principals because agents spend time and effort trying to influence principals instead of 
being productive.  Other costs of influence activities include inefficient decision-making 
and deadweight losses in firm value (Milgrom 1988; MacLeod 2003).   
 Du et al. (2012) studied Chinese government evaluations of Chinese state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and found that influence activities affected performance evaluations 
positively. To assess the level of influence activities, Du et al. (2012) used the political 
connections of the SOEs’ top executives and the geographic proximity between the 
Chinese government central offices and the SOE headquarters.  The study found that the 
level of political connections and geographic proximity positively affected the SOEs’ 
evaluation scores.     
 The fourth cost of principal discretion is agent uncertainty about performance 
measures (Bol 2008).   When principals use discretion, agents may not know what 
behaviors or outcomes principals expect.  This ambiguity creates uncertainty about 
performance measures.  Uncertainty about performance measures may decrease agent 
motivation which can lead to decreased agent effort.  Uncertainty about performance 
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measures is costly to principals because uncertainty reduces the incentive effect of 
compensation contracts (Bol 2008).   
   Ittner et al. (2003) showed that allowing subjectivity in balanced scorecard 
weighting led to performance measure uncertainty.  Measures that were predictive of 
future financial performance were ignored and too much weight was put on measures that 
were not predictive.  The study found that criteria were changed from quarter to quarter 
and factors other than the chosen performance measures were included in the evaluation.  
 This section discussed both the benefits and costs of principal discretion in agent 
performance evaluation.  On the one hand, principal discretion compensates for 
inadequate objective performance measures, reduces agent compensation risk, limits 
performance measure manipulation, motivates adaptive agent behavior and reduces 
perceived unfairness.  On the other hand, principal discretion may lead to reneging by the 
principal, inaccurate performance assessments, influence activities and uncertainty about 
performance measures.   
 Chapter Summary 
 Incentive contract framing influences agents’ judgments and behavior.  Studies 
show that even though agents prefer incentive contracts framed as bonuses rather than 
penalties, incentive contracts without principal discretion that are framed as penalties led 
to higher agent effort than contracts framed as bonuses.  However, in practice, many 
incentive contracts allow for principal discretion.  Principal discretion introduces benefits 
and costs that may change agent behavior.  For example, incentive contracts with 
principal discretion that are framed as bonuses led to higher agent effort than incentive 
contracts framed as penalties (Christ et al. 2012).    
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 Because studies on the effects of incentive contract framing such as Hannan et al. 
(2005) and Christ et al. (2012) use different mechanisms, it is unclear how incentive 
contract framing shapes agent behavior.  Christ et al. (2012) suggests that future research 
examine when the effect of one mechanism might outweigh the other.  To more fully 
understand how contract framing affects agent behavior, the next chapter hypothesizes 1) 
how the two models fit together and 2) how the use of principal discretion in agent 
performance evaluation affects the new combined model.  
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Chapter 3 Hypotheses Development 
 
 Chapter Overview 
 This chapter combines the Hannan et al. (2005) and Christ et al. (2012) models 
and adds principal discretion in agent performance evaluation to hypothesize how 
contract framing affects agent behavior.  Section 3.2 illustrates the overall model for the 
study.  Section 3.3 explains the model and Section 3.4 presents the study’s hypotheses. 
Section 3.5 concludes with a summary of the hypotheses.  
 Model Overview 
 The figure below illustrates the model for the study: 






 Explanation of the Model  
 This section explains the model found in Figure 3.  Each subsection explains a 
single path in the model.   
3.3.1 Effect of Contract Frame and Principal Discretion on Perceived Fairness 
(Path 1) 
 Principals usually evaluate agent performance to determine reward outcomes (Bol 
2008).  Principal discretion in agent performance evaluation means that principals use 
subjective judgment to assess performance. Principal judgment may be based on personal 
impressions, feelings and options, rather than on external facts (Bol 2008).  Procedural 
justice is the fairness of the process used to determine an outcome whereas distributive 
justice is the fairness of the outcome (Folger and Konovsky 1989). An important element 
of procedural justice in agent performance evaluation is consistency (Prendergast & 
Topel 1993).  Principal discretion, however, opens the door to inconsistency.  The use of 
principal discretion in agent performance evaluation can lead to low perceptions of 
procedural justice by managers (Bellavance 2013). 
 Incentive contracts are formal controls that can be framed either as a bonus that 
offers agents a monetary reward if performance goals are met or as a penalty that reduces 
monetary payouts if performance goals are not met (Christ et al. 2012).  Luft (1994) 
attributes the differences in agent preferences for bonus and penalty contracts to loss 
aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  Loss aversion describes the finding that 
individuals experience greater disutility from the perceived loss associated with paying a 
penalty than from the perceived forgone gain associated with not receiving an equivalent 
bonus (Hannan et al. 2005).  Loss aversion suggests that having to pay a penalty under a 
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penalty contract is a less favorable outcome than foregoing a similar sized bonus under a 
bonus contract.   
 In general, people expect and want procedures to be fair and outcomes to be 
favorable.  People will be more likely to begin to ask questions and look for information 
to make sense of their situations when outcomes are unfavorable (Pyszcznski & 
Greenberg 1981).  When people are looking to make sense of their situations, external 
cues that address their information needs are especially influential.  When an outcome is 
unfavorable, the level of procedural fairness provides information that can make sense of 
the situation (Brockner and Wiesenfield 1996). Therefore, people will react to 
unfavorable outcomes more than they will to favorable outcomes by closely examining 
the procedures that gave rise to those outcomes.  This will increase the effect of perceived 
procedural fairness on their interpretation of and reaction especially to negative 
outcomes.   
 Under a favorable outcome such as a bonus contract, people will be less likely to 
seek additional information to make sense of the situation because the situation is 
favorable.  It follows that the level of procedural fairness will not influence people’s 
fairness perceptions.  Therefore the use of principal discretion will not moderate people’s 
fairness perceptions of a bonus contract.   
  When an outcome is unfavorable such as a penalty contract, people are more 
likely to seek information to make sense of their situations.  The level of procedural 
fairness will provide external cues to address people’s information needs.  Lower (higher) 
levels of procedural fairness lead to lower (higher) perceived fairness than higher (lower) 
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levels of procedural fairness.  The existence of principal discretion leads to lower levels 
of procedural fairness than the absence of principal discretion (Bellavance 2013).  It 
follows that the existence (absence) of principal discretion leads to lower (higher) 
perceived fairness that increases (decreases) the negative effect of the penalty frame. 
Therefore the negative effect of a penalty contract is greater when accompanied by 
principal discretion.  
 Taken together, agents under a penalty contract will report lower levels of 
perceived fairness than agents under a bonus contract. Also principal discretion will 
moderate the relationship between contract type and perceived fairness such that using a 
penalty contract will reduce perceived fairness more with the use of principal discretion 
than without the use of principal discretion (Path 1). 
3.3.2 Effect of Contract Frame and Principal Discretion on Expected 
Disappointment (Path 2) 
 Attribution theory explains how people make causal explanations. When 
considering the principal’s choice of incentive contract, attribution theory suggests that 
agents are more likely to attribute the principal’s choice of incentive contract to the 
personal characteristics of the principal rather than to situational factors (Ross 1977).  
This tendency of perceivers to over emphasize causality to internal factors in the actor 
rather than to situational factors is commonly known as correspondence bias or 
fundamental attribution error (Green et al. 1985). Agents have an unfavorable view of 
penalty contracts due to loss aversion. Attribution theory suggests that agents will have a 
negative view of the principal’s decision to implement a penalty contract. Therefore 
agents will attribute negative character qualities to those principals who choose to 
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implement penalty contracts. This attribution will affect agents’ interpretation of 
principal discretion. Instead of viewing principal discretion as a way to help agents, 
agents will view principal discretion as a way to further penalize them.   Therefore, 
agents will expect to be more disappointed when the penalty contract includes principal 
discretion than when the penalty contract does not include principal discretion.   
 In summary, agents under a penalty contract with discretion will expect to be 
more disappointed about having to pay a penalty than agents under a bonus contract with 
discretion will expect to be about not receiving an economically equivalent bonus. Also 
principal discretion will moderate the relationship between penalty contract and expected 
disappointment such that agents under a penalty contract will have higher expected 
disappointment with the use of principal discretion than without the use of principal 
discretion (Path 2). 
3.3.3 Effect of Contract Frame and Principal Discretion on Perceived Intrusion 
(Path 3) 
 Intrusion is defined as “interference with normal processes and activities” (Christ 
et al. 2008). Intrusion can be invasive and possibly disruptive, with the controlling party 
engaging in some kind of participation or interference in the controlled party’s processes 
and activities. Change management research documents the disruptive nature of 
mandatory management innovations (Christ et al. 2008).  Specifically, a “loss of routine” 
or a “destruction of existing habit” that results from management innovations plays an 
important role in the process of change and in the level of resistance to change (Christ et 
al. 2008).  Similarly, the intrusiveness of a control system plays an important role in 
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whether the control system impacts the level of trust in an organization (Christ et al. 
2008).  
 The trust literature shows the effects of negatively framed controls.  Negatively 
framed controls damage trust (Das and Teng 1998; Enzle and Anderson 1993; Malhotra 
and Murnighan 2002) because they are perceived as interfering with agents’ normal 
processes and activities (Christ et al. 2008). The effects of framing an incentive contract 
negatively as a penalty contract are similar to the effects of negatively framed controls 
(Christ et al. 2012). It follows that agents will report higher levels of perceived intrusion 
under penalty contracts than under bonus contracts.   
 Attribution theory suggests that agents faced with a penalty contract will attribute 
negative qualities to principals (see above). Attribution theory explains that people 
attribute the cause of another person’s negative behavior to his or her negative character 
qualities rather than to situational factors. For example, someone’s anger is because he or 
she is bad-tempered. If agents perceive the principal’s selection of a penalty contract as 
intrusive (Christ et al. 2012) then attribution theory suggests agents will attribute the 
selection of a penalty contract to the principal’s intrusive personality.  This attribution 
will affect agents’ interpretation of principal discretion in agent performance evaluation.  
Instead of viewing principal discretion as a way to help agents, agents will view principal 
discretion negatively due to their view of the principal’s personality. Therefore, agents 
will have higher levels of perceived intrusion when the penalty contract includes 
principal discretion than when the penalty contract excludes principal discretion.  
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 Taken together, agents under a penalty contract will report higher levels of 
perceived intrusion than agents under a bonus contract.  Also principal discretion will 
moderate the relationship between penalty contract and perceived intrusion such that 
using a penalty contract will increase perceived intrusion more with the use of principal 
discretion than without the use of principal discretion (Path 3).  
3.3.4 Effect of Contract Frame and Principal Discretion on Perceived Autonomy 
(Path 4)  
 Formal controls reduce agent autonomy (Das and Teng 1998).  That is, a formal 
control limits the decision rights of agents by specifying clear boundaries which may 
include specific behaviors, operations or activities (Christ 2008).  In general, when 
individuals feel that their freedoms are being restricted, individuals have negative 
reactions.  Psychological Reactance Theory (Brehm and Brehm 2013) provides a 
framework for understanding the psychological effects of restrictions to freedoms.  The 
theory assumes that a person has a set of free behaviors and will experience a form of 
psychological arousal called reactance whenever any of those behaviors are eliminated or 
threatened with elimination. The person who experiences reactance will be motivated to 
restore the specific freedom that was lost or threatened.  Reactance may lead to hostility 
or aggression toward the threatening agent of the restriction.   
 Implementation of a negatively framed control damages the trust environment 
(Das and Teng 1998; Enzle and Anderson 1993; Malhotra and Murnighan 2002).  
Negatively framed controls damage the trust environment because agents perceive that 
negatively framed controls reduce autonomy (Christ et al. 2008).   The effects of framing 
an incentive contract negatively as a penalty contract are similar to the effects of 
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negatively framed controls (Christ et al. 2012). It follows that agents will report lower 
levels of perceived autonomy under penalty contracts than under bonus contracts.   
 Attribution theory suggests that agents faced with penalty contracts will attribute 
negative qualities to principals (see above).  Because agents perceive a loss of autonomy 
with penalty contracts, they will interpret the principal’s decision to implement the 
penalty contract as a controlling behavior.  If agents perceive the principal’s selection of 
a penalty contract as a controlling behavior, then attribution theory suggests that agents 
will attribute the principal’s controlling behavior to the principal’s controlling 
personality.  This attribution will influence agent interpretation of principal discretion.  
Instead of viewing principal discretion as a way to help agents, agents will view principal 
discretion as a way for the principal to control the agent. Therefore, agents will have 
lower levels of perceived autonomy when the penalty contract includes principal 
discretion than when the penalty contract excludes principal discretion.   
 In summary, agents will report lower levels of perceived autonomy under a 
penalty contract than under a bonus contract.  Also principal discretion will moderate the 
relationship between penalty contract and perceived autonomy such that using a penalty 
contract will decrease perceived autonomy more with the use of principal discretion than 
without the use of principal discretion (Path 4). 
3.3.5 Effect of Perceived Autonomy and Perceived Intrusion on Signals of 
Questioning Integrity and Questioning Competence (Paths 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d)  
 When agents feel that controls are intrusive or decrease agents’ perceived 
autonomy, agents will interpret these controls as signals of principals’ beliefs about 
agents (Christ et al. 2012).  As agents’ perceived loss of autonomy decreases and 
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perceived intrusion increases, agents are more inclined to believe that principals are 
questioning agent integrity and competence (Christ et al. 2012). More specifically, agents 
will perceive that principals are questioning their competence (Path 5a) and their integrity 
(Path 5b) more as perceived intrusion increases. Also, agents will perceive that principals 
are questioning their competence (Path 5c) and their integrity (Path 5d) more as 
perceived autonomy decreases. 
3.3.6 Effect of Signals of Questioning Integrity and Questioning Competence on 
Perceived Trust (Paths 6a, 6b)  
 To the degree that principals question agent integrity and competence, agents will 
perceive less trust from principals regardless of the level of principal discretion (Das and 
Teng 2001; Christ et al. 2012).  Specifically, agents who perceive more questioning of 
their competence will report lower levels of perceived trust from principals than agents 
who perceive less questioning of their competence from principals (Path 6a). Also, agents 
who perceive more questioning of their integrity will report lower levels of perceived 
trust from principals than agents who perceive less questioning of their integrity from 
principals (Path 6b). 
3.3.7 Effect of Perceived Trust on Reciprocal Trust (Path 7) 
 Social projection theory states that individuals have a tendency to expect 
similarities between themselves and others (Krueger 1998).  This leads individuals to 
base what they think others will do on their own beliefs.  It follows that principals will 
expect agents to behave the way principals themselves would behave.  Therefore, 
principals’ signals of trust (mistrust) in agents are signals of the principals’ 
trustworthiness (lack of trustworthiness). Trust can generate the very behavior that might 
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logically seem to be its precondition and distrust can lead to behavior that bolsters the 
validity of the distrust (Gambetta 1988). Because trust is reciprocal (Gambetta 1988), 
agents will decrease trust in principals as the level of perceived trust from principals 
diminishes regardless of the presence or absence of principal discretion.  Therefore, 
agents who perceive less trust from principals will trust principals less than agents who 
perceive more trust from principals (Path 7).   
3.3.8 Effect of Expected Disappointment on Effort for Task Under Contract (Path 
8) 
 Conventional economic theory assumes that agents who have higher incremental 
utility for money will work harder for money than those who have lower incremental 
utility for money (Hannan et al. 2005).  It follows that if agents who have higher 
incremental utility for money do not receive the higher payment (i.e. because they had to 
pay the penalty or forego the bonus), they will experience a greater reduction in utility 
than those who have a lower incremental utility for money (Hannan et al. 2005).   
“Expected disappointment” relates to this decrease in utility from having to pay a penalty 
or by not receiving a bonus. Therefore greater expected disappointment will result in 
higher agent effort (Path 8).  
3.3.9 Effect of Perceived Fairness on Effort for Task Under Contract (Path 9) 
 The theory of reciprocity suggests that individuals who feel that they are treated 
fairly by another party will reciprocate by treating the other party kindly in return 
(Goranson and Berkowitz 1966).  It follows that agents who perceive their contract to be 
fairer will choose a higher level of effort than those who perceive their contract to be less 
fair (Hannan et al. 2005).  The reciprocity will persist for both bonus and penalty 
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contracts regardless of the level of principal discretion in agent performance evaluation. 
Therefore agents who perceive their contracts to be less fair will expend lower effort than 
agents who perceive their contracts to be more fair (Path 9).   
 
3.3.10 Effect of Reciprocal Trust on Effort for Task Under Contract (Path 10) 
 When reciprocal trust is low, agents perceive that pay is less certain than when 
reciprocal trust is high. When agent pay is less certain, agents carry more risk than when 
agent pay is more certain.  When agents bear more risk, agents want more pay for equal 
work which makes agents work less for equal pay.  Therefore agents who reciprocate less 
trust will expend lower effort than agents who reciprocate more trust (Path 10). 
3.3.11 Effect of Effort for Task Under Contract on Performance (Path 11) 
 When skill is held constant and the task is effort sensitive, increased effort leads 
to an improvement in the rewarded dimension of task performance (Bonner & Sprinkle 
2002).  Incentives increase agent desire to increase performance.  This desire to increase 
performance motivates agents to exert effort because increases in effort are expected to 
lead to increases in expected performance.  Therefore, agent performance will increase 
with effort on task under contract (Path 11).  
3.3.12 Effect of Reciprocal Trust on Effort for Task Not Under Contract (Path 12) 
 In the task not under contract that allows principal discretion over agent 
compensation, agent trust in principals to reward agents becomes important in agent 
effort choice due to principal opportunism (Fisher et al. 2005).  When trust is low, agents 
have less expectancy that agent effort will be rewarded by principals and will choose less 
effort.  In contrast, when trust is high, agents will have a higher positive expectancy that 
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agent effort will be rewarded by principals (Christ et al. 2012).  Therefore agent effort on 
task not under contract will increase as reciprocal trust increases (Path 12).   
3.3.13 Effect of Effort for Task Not Under Contract on Performance (Path 13) 
 Holding skill constant, increased effort leads to improvements in performance 
(Bonner & Sprinkle 2002).  It follows that agent performance on the task not under 
contract will increase as effort increases (Path 13).   
3.3.14 Effect of Perceived Fairness on Perceived Trust (Path 14) 
 To the degree that agents perceive that their contracts are unfair, agents will 
perceive that they are being treated unfairly by the principal.  Agents who perceive that 
they are being treated unfairly by the principal will perceive less trust from the principal.  
3.3.15 Effect of Expected Disappointment on Perceived Trust (Path 15) 
 Martinez and Zeelenberg (2015) found that increased disappointment induced 
higher initial transfers in a trust game due to loss aversion. Thinking of disappointment 
led first movers to avoid feelings of disappointment.  To avoid feelings of 
disappointment, first movers avoided disappointing others.  To avoid disappointing 
others, first movers transferred more money.    
 Similarly, to the degree that agents expect disappointment, agents will avoid 
feelings of disappointment.  To avoid feelings of disappointment, agents will avoid 
disappointing the principal.  To avoid disappointing the principal, agents will perceive 
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trust from the principal.  It follows that greater expected disappointment will result in 
greater perceived trust. 2  
 Hypotheses 
 This section presents the study’s four research hypotheses based on the model 
presented in Section 3.3.  Each subsection explains one of the four hypotheses.   
3.4.1 Effect of Contract Frame on Agent Effort for Task Under Contract 
In a setting without principal discretion, agent trust is not required for the task 
under contract because the incentive contract specifies the payout for each potential 
outcome.  Expected disappointment will be higher under a penalty contract than under a 
bonus contract (Path 2).  Therefore, agent effort on the task under contract will be greater 
under a penalty contract than under a bonus contract because greater expected 
disappointment will result in higher agent effort (Path 8).  The study’s first hypothesis is 
formally stated below and illustrated in Figure 4:   
H1:  Agent effort on the task under contract will be greater under a penalty 





                                                 
2 Because Martinez and Zeelenberg (2015) used a trust game and because Task 2 in this study is a trust 
game, this study expects similar results.  Therefore, agents would trust more with higher expected 




Figure 4: Predicted Effect of Contract Type on Agent Effort for Task Under 
Contract 
 
3.4.2 Effect of Contract Frame and Principal Discretion on Agent Effort for Task 
Under Contract 
 
 This subsection adds principal discretion in agent performance evaluation to the 
setting discussed in Section 3.4.1. The agent’s trust in the principal becomes important in 
the agent’s effort decision for the task under contract because the principal has discretion 
over the agent’s performance evaluation.  Under a penalty (bonus) contract, the 
interaction of principal discretion with contract frame leads to lower (higher) perceived 
fairness (Path 1), higher (lower) expected disappointment (Path 2), higher (lower) levels 
of perceived intrusion (Path 3) and lower (higher) levels of perceived autonomy (Path 4).   
 Reduced perceived fairness leads to lower (higher) perceived trust (Path 14), 
lower (higher) reciprocal trust (Path 7) and lower (higher) effort (Paths 9 and 10). The 
perceived intrusion and perceived autonomy effects lead to higher (lower) levels of 
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questioning competence and questioning integrity (Paths 5a, 5b, 5c and 5d), lower 
(higher) perceived trust (Paths 6a, 6b), lower (higher) reciprocal trust (Path 7) and lower 
(higher) effort (Path 10).   Taken together, the study predicts that agent effort on the task 
under contract will be lower (higher) under a penalty contract with (without) principal 
discretion.  Also agent effort on the task under contract will be higher (lower) under a 
bonus contract with (without) principal discretion.  
 Notwithstanding this prediction, one reason why principal discretion in agent 
performance evaluation may result in a main effect instead of an interaction effect is loss 
aversion. The greater expected disappointment from the interaction of principal discretion 
and the penalty contract frame (Path 2) may increase aversion to disappointment.  
Aversion to disappointment may increase the desire to not disappoint the principal.  The 
desire to not disappoint the principal may lead to higher perceived trust (Path 15), higher 
reciprocal trust (Path 7) and higher effort (Paths 8 and 10).  Principal discretion then 
would increase effort on the task under contract for both penalty and bonus contracts.   
 Attribution theory, however, suggests that agents attribute negative personal 
qualities to the principal as a result of the principal’s choice to implement a penalty 
contract.  The attribution of negative personal qualities to the principal will diminish the 
desire to not disappoint the principal. It follows that the negative effect on effort of lower 
perceived fairness, lower perceived autonomy and higher perceived intrusion will 
dominate the positive effect of loss aversion on effort.    
 The study’s second hypothesis follows and is illustrated in Figure 5:  
H2:  Principal discretion in agent performance evaluation will moderate the 
relationship between incentive contract and agent effort on the task under 
contract such that agent effort under a penalty (bonus) contract will be 






Figure 5: Predicted Effect of Contract Type and Principal Discretion on Agent 
Effort for Task Under Contract 
 
  
3.4.3 Effect of Contract Frame on Agent Effort for Task Not Under Contract 
 In a setting in which the incentive contract does not govern all tasks for which the 
agent is responsible, the agent’s trust in the principal becomes important in the agent’s 
effort decision for the task not under contract.  This setting requires trust because the 
principal has discretion over the agent’s compensation for the ungoverned task.  A 
penalty (bonus) contract leads to lower (higher) perceived fairness (Path 1), higher 
(lower) expected disappointment (Path 2), higher (lower) levels of perceived intrusion 
(Path 3) and lower (higher) levels of perceived autonomy (Path 4).  
 Higher expected disappointment leads to higher (lower) perceived trust (Path 15), 
higher (lower) reciprocal trust (Path 7) and higher (lower) effort (Path 12).  The 
perceived fairness, perceived intrusion and perceived autonomy effects will dominate the 
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expected disappointment effect (based on Christ et al. 2012).  The perceived fairness 
effect leads to lower (higher) perceived trust (Path 14), lower (higher) reciprocal trust 
(Path 7) and to lower (higher) effort (Path 12).  The perceived intrusion and perceived 
autonomy effects lead to higher (lower) levels of questioning competence and 
questioning integrity (Paths 5a, 5b, 5c and 5d), lower (higher) perceived trust (Paths 6a, 
6b), lower (higher) reciprocal trust (Path 7) and lower (higher) effort (Path 12).  This 
leads to the study’s third hypothesis which is illustrated in Figure 6:  
H3: Agent effort on the task not under contract will be greater under a bonus 
contract than under a penalty contract.   
 
 
Figure 6: Predicted Effect of Contract Type on Agent Effort for Task Not Under 
Contract 
 
3.4.4 Effect of Contract Frame and Principal Discretion on Agent Effort for Task 
Not Under Contract 
 This subsection now adds principal discretion in agent performance evaluation to 
the setting discussed in Section 3.4.3.  The agent’s trust in the principal is important in 
the agent’s effort decision for the task not under contract because the principal has 
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discretion over both the agent’s performance evaluation and the agent’s compensation for 
the ungoverned task. Under a penalty (bonus) contract, the interaction of incentive 
contract frame and principal discretion in agent performance evaluation leads to lower 
(higher) perceived fairness (Path 1), higher (lower) expected disappointment (Path 2), 
higher (lower) levels of perceived intrusion (Path 3) and lower (higher) levels of 
perceived autonomy (Path 4).  
 Lower perceived fairness leads to lower (higher) perceived trust (Path 14), lower 
(higher) reciprocal trust (Path 7) and lower (higher) effort (Path 12).  The perceived 
intrusion and perceived autonomy effects lead to higher (lower) levels of questioning 
competence and questioning integrity (Paths 5a, 5b, 5c and 5d), lower (higher) perceived 
trust (Paths 6a, 6b), lower (higher) reciprocal trust (Path 7) and lower (higher) effort 
(Path 12). Taken together, the study predicts that agent effort on the task not under 
contract will be lower (higher) under a penalty contract with (without) principal 
discretion.  Also agent effort on the task not under contract will be higher (lower) under a 
bonus contract with (without) principal discretion.  
 Notwithstanding this prediction, one reason why principal discretion in agent 
performance evaluation may result in a main effect instead of an interaction effect is loss 
aversion. The greater expected disappointment from the interaction of principal discretion 
and the penalty contract frame (Path 2) may increase aversion to disappointment.  
Aversion to disappointment may increase the desire to not disappoint the principal.  The 
desire to not disappoint the principal may lead to higher perceived trust (Path 15), higher 
reciprocal trust (Path 7) and higher effort (Path 12).  Principal discretion then would 
increase effort on the task not under contract for both penalty and bonus contracts.   
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 Attribution theory, however, suggests that agents attribute negative personal 
qualities to the principal as a result of the principal’s choice to implement a penalty 
contract.  The attribution of negative personal qualities to the principal will diminish the 
desire to not disappoint the principal. It follows that the negative effect on effort of lower 
perceived fairness, lower perceived autonomy and higher perceived intrusion will 
dominate the positive effect of loss aversion on effort.  The study’s last hypothesis 
follows and is illustrated in Figure 7:  
H4:  Principal discretion in agent performance evaluation will moderate the 
relationship between incentive contract and agent effort on the task not 
under contract such that agent effort under a penalty (bonus) contract will 




Figure 7: Predicted Effect of Contract Type and Principal Discretion on Agent 
Effort for Task Not Under Contract 
 
 Notwithstanding this prediction, one reason why the study may not find the 
expected interaction for the task not under contract is because workplace norms might 
influence agent interpretation of principal discretion. Workplace norms may play an 
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important role especially for tasks that are not under contract.  For example, workplace 
norms related to cooperation, trust and reciprocity may mitigate the negative effect of 
principal discretion under a penalty contract.  Alternatively, workplace norms related to 
lack of cooperation, mistrust and lack of reciprocity may lessen the positive effect of 
principal discretion under a bonus contract.     
 Chapter Summary 
 This chapter combines the Hannan et al. (2005) and Christ et al. (2012) models 
and adds principal discretion in agent performance evaluation to hypothesize how 
contract framing affects agent behavior.  These hypotheses are summarized in the 
following table: 
Table 1: Hypotheses Summary 
 
 Effect of Contract Frame on Agent Effort for Task Under Contract  
H1: Agent effort on the task under contract will be greater under a penalty contract than 
under a bonus contract.  
  
 Effect of Contract Frame and Principal Discretion on Agent Effort for Task 
Under Contract  
H2: Principal discretion in agent performance evaluation will moderate the relationship 
between incentive contract and agent effort on the task under contract such that 
agent effort under a penalty (bonus) contract will be lower (higher) with principal 
discretion than without principal discretion. 
  
 Effect of Contract Frame on Agent Effort for Task Not Under Contract 
H3: Agent effort on the task not under contract will be greater under a bonus contract 
than under a penalty contract.   
  
 Effect of Contract Frame and Principal Discretion on Agent Effort for Task 
Not Under Contract 
H4: Principal discretion in agent performance evaluation will moderate the relationship 
between incentive contract and agent effort on the task not under contract such that 
agent effort under a penalty (bonus) contract will be lower (higher) with principal 




 Agent effort on the task under contract is hypothesized to be greater under a 
penalty contract than under a bonus contract. Agent effort on the task under contract 
should be lower (higher) under a penalty (bonus) contract with principal discretion than 
without principal discretion.  Agent effort on the task not under contract is expected to be 
greater under a bonus contract than under a penalty contract.  Agent effort on the task not 
under contract should be lower (higher) under a penalty (bonus) contract with principal 
discretion than without principal discretion. The next chapter describes the research 





Chapter 4 Research Method 
 
 Chapter Overview 
 This chapter describes the research methods used to test the hypotheses developed 
in Chapter 3 and is structured as follows:  Section 4.2 explains the experimental design.  
Section 4.3 describes the participants, tasks and procedures used in the experiment.  
Sections 4.4 and 4.5 explain the operationalization of the independent and dependent 
variables, respectively.  Section 4.6 provides descriptions of items found in the complete 
theoretical model as illustrated in Figure 3.  Section 4.7 provides a summary of the 
chapter.  
 Experimental Design 
 The study uses a 2 (Contract Frame) x 2 (Principal Discretion) between-
participants experimental design.  Contract Frame is an incentive contract framed either 
as a bonus contract (hereafter, bonus contract) or as a penalty contract (hereafter, penalty 
contract).  Bonus contract pays agents a bonus if their performance meets or exceeds the 
performance target.  Penalty contract requires agents to pay a penalty if their 
performance fails to meet the performance target.  The study manipulates the second 
variable - Principal Discretion - by using either an ex ante performance target (hereafter, 
no principal discretion) or an ex post performance target set by the principal (hereafter, 
principal discretion).  The four experimental conditions are:  bonus contract/no principal 
discretion, bonus contract/principal discretion, penalty contract/no principal discretion 
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and penalty contract/principal discretion. Two dependent variables are then measured:  
1) agent effort on the task under contract and 2) agent effort on the task not under 
contract.  The following table summarizes the 2 x 2 research design.   
 
Table 2: Experimental Design 
 
  Contract Frame 
  Bonus Penalty 
Principal Discretion No Cell 1 Cell 3 
 Yes Cell 2 Cell 4 
 
 Administration of the Experiment 
 Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions.  
Unlike Christ et al. (2012), the experiment used a confederate to be the principal rather 
than a one-to-one pairing between principals and agents.  Based on the theory from 
Chapter 3, the study does not depend on the ratio of agents to principals. Also, whether 
the principal is a confederate should not affect the results because the principal does not 
interact with the agents.  The study relies on agents believing that the principal is a 
person who chooses their contracts. This is important because this choice signals the 
principal’s trust in the agent (Christ et al. 2012).  The principal’s role and principal’s 
compensation scheme in this study are identical to the principal’s role and principal’s 
compensation scheme found in Christ et al. (2012). 
 To make sure that results were not affected by labels, the study referred to the 
agent role and the principal role as Participant A and Participant B, respectively.  
Participants remained in the agent role throughout both tasks of the experiment.  The 
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experiment used a single-period model to control for reputation and other social effects 
that were not the focus of the study.   
4.3.1 Participants 
 Participants were 117 undergraduate students from a large public university who 
were recruited through the business school’s research participation program.  Participants 
received research participation credit and also had the opportunity to earn monetary 
compensation through their participation in the study.   
4.3.2 Task 1 and Task 2 Descriptions  
 Participants began the experiment with an endowment. Agents in the bonus 
contract conditions were endowed with 850 points and agents in the penalty contract 
conditions started with 1,000 points.  The principal began with 250 points in all 
experimental conditions. At the end of the experiment, participants were paid using the 
following formula:  .025 x Earned Points = Payment in U.S. dollars.   
 Participants in the experiment completed two computerized tasks which were both 
adapted from Christ et al. (2012).  The first task required agents to select a portfolio of 
investments for the benefit of the principal.  Agents paid for the investments using points 
from their endowment.  Agents could earn a bonus or pay a penalty depending on 
whether their portfolio achieved a performance target.  In the two principal discretion 
conditions, bonus contract/principal discretion, and penalty contract/principal discretion, 
the principal could adjust ex post the performance target that determined whether agents 
received a bonus or paid a penalty.   
 The first task followed prior literature (e.g. Christ et al. 2012; Fehr et al. 1993) 
and represented agent effort using a costly choice.  The operationalization of effort was 
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consistent with the agency theory definition of effort (Baiman 1982).  Investing in shares 
was an effort choice that was controlled by agents, resulted in disutility (agents paid for 
the shares) and increased the probability of reaching the target outcome (Christ et al. 
2012, Hannan et al. 2005).    
 The second task was a modified trust game with agent pay determined entirely by 
the principal rather than by incentive contracts.  Agents purchased investments on behalf 
of the principal and then the principal decided how much of the investment returns to 
share with the agent.  Similar to Task 1, agents’ costly choices represented a measure of 
agent effort (Christ et al. 2012; Fehr et al. 1993).   
4.3.3 Task 1 Procedures 
 The experimental procedure for Task 1 consisted of nine steps.   
1)  Enter the Experiment 
 Participants entered the room and the administrator assigned each participant to a 
computer station.  Once seated, participants were told to follow the instructions on the 
computer screen.   
2)  Read the Overview of the Study 
 Participants read and learned the instructions for both roles (either Participant A 
or Participant B). After participants had finished reading the instructions, the computer 
randomly assigned participants to their experimental condition.   
3)  Learn about the Agent Investment Decision 
  Agents had the task of selecting a portfolio of investments from 30 possible 
investments and paying for their portfolio using their endowment.  The goal was to 
maximize the returns for the principal by selecting the 10 shares that were expected to 
60 
 
make the highest returns in the next period. Agents selected and paid for one share each 
of 10 different investments which earned points for the principal.  
 The two types of investments that agents could choose from were either “Bell” or 
“Whistle” investments.  Agents paid 10 points for each Bell share and 25 points for each 
Whistle share. Although Whistle shares cost more, Whistle shares earned higher returns 
than Bell shares.  Because agents paid for the investments from their endowment, agents 
preferred to purchase the cheaper Bell shares.  The principal, however, favored the more 
expensive Whistle shares because the Whistle shares earned higher returns. On average, 
the 15 Bell shares earned approximately 20 points per share in the next period and the 15 
Whistle shares earned approximately 50 points per share in the next period. The study 
provided participants with graphical representations of the previous 19 periods of returns 
(points per share) for each of the 30 possible investments.  The graphs did not show the 
expected returns for the next period.  For example, the graph below shows one 
investment’s return history of points per share (Christ et al. 2012):  





4)  Learn about the Principal Contract Implementation Decision 
 The principal decided which type of control system to implement prior to agents’ 
investment decisions.  The control system established a bonus or penalty system that 
either included or did not include principal discretion. In all four experimental conditions, 
bonuses (penalties) were paid from (to) an administrators fund rather than from (to) the 
principal’s endowment. This kept the principal’s cost of contract implementation (at 50 
points) constant across all conditions. 
5)  Learn about the Principal Discretion Decision (Discretion Conditions Only) 
 Participants learned that the principal could decide whether and how much to 
adjust the performance target which determined whether or not agents received a bonus 
in the bonus contract condition or paid a penalty in the penalty contract condition. The 
principal could set the target anywhere between 400 and 600 points after they had learned 
how many points the agent had earned.  The principal and agents received this 





6)  Learn about the Agent Compensation Scheme 
 The agent compensation scheme is illustrated in Table 3: 
Table 3: Agent Compensation Scheme 
 






Total Share Returns 
< 500 
850 points 
- Cost of 
Shares 
1000 points – 




Returns >= 500 
850 points 
- Cost of 
Shares  
+ 150 bonus 
points 
1000 points – 
Cost of Shares 
Principal 
Discretion 
Total Share Returns 
< Performance 
Target Selected by 
Principal 
850 points 
- Cost of 
Shares 
 
1000 points – 






Selected by Principal 
850 points 
- Cost of 
Shares 
+ 150 bonus 
points 
 
1000 points – 
Cost of Shares 
  
 Agents began with an endowment of 850 points in the two bonus contract 
conditions and 1,000 points in the two penalty contract conditions.  Agents paid for the 
10 shares selected (10 points for each Bell share and 25 points for each Whistle share) 
from this fund. Agents could earn or lose points depending on their assigned condition.  
 In the bonus contract/no principal discretion condition, agents received a 150-
point bonus if the total amount of points earned from the 10 shares equaled or exceeded 
500 points.  If the total return from the 10 shares was less than 500 points, agents did not 
receive a bonus.  In the bonus contract/principal discretion condition, agents received a 
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150-point bonus if the total amount of points earned from the 10 shares equaled or 
exceeded the performance target selected by the principal.  If the total return from the 10 
shares was less than the selected target, agents did not receive a bonus.  
 For example, suppose the agent chose 7 Bell shares and 3 Whistle shares.  Also 
assume that the returns for these investments exceeded 500 points in the bonus 
contract/no principal discretion condition or exceeded the performance target selected by 
the principal in the bonus contract/principal discretion condition.  The agent’s payoff 
will equal 850 – (7 x 10) – (3 x 25) + 150 = 855 points. If the returns for the investments 
were less than 500 in the bonus contract/no principal discretion condition or were less 
than the performance target selected by the principal in the bonus contract/principal 
discretion condition, the agent’s payoff will equal 850 – (7 x 10) – (3 x 25) = 705. 
 In the penalty contract/no principal discretion condition, agents paid a penalty of 
150 points if the total return from their selected investments was less than 500 points.  If 
the return from the investments was 500 points or above, then agents did not pay a 
penalty.  In the penalty contract/principal discretion condition, agents paid a penalty of 
150 points if the total return from their selected investments was less than the 
performance target selected by the principal.  If the total return from the 10 shares 
equaled or exceeded the performance target selected by the principal, then agents did not 
pay a penalty.    
 For example, suppose the agent chose 7 Bell shares and 3 Whistle shares.  Also 
assume that returns for these investments were less than 500 points in the penalty 
contract/no principal discretion condition or were less than the performance target 
selected by the principal in the penalty contract/principal discretion condition.  The 
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agent’s payoff will equal 1000 – (7 x 10) – (3 x 25) – 150 = 705 points.  If the total return 
for the investments exceeded 500 in the penalty contract/no principal discretion 
condition or the performance target selected by the principal in the penalty 
contract/principal discretion condition, the agent’s payoff will equal 1000 – (7 x 10) – (3 
x 25) = 855. 
6)  Learn about the Principal Compensation Scheme  
The principal compensation scheme is illustrated in Table 4:   
Table 4: Principal Compensation Scheme 
 





Returns < 500 
250 points + 
total share 
returns – 50 
points for cost of 
control system 
250 points + 
total share 
returns – 50 




Returns >= 500 
250 points + 
total share 
returns – 50 
points for cost of 
control system 
 
250 points + 
total share 
returns – 50 










250 points + 
total share 
returns – 50 
points for cost of 
control system  
250 points + 
total share 
returns – 50 








250 points + 
total share 
returns – 50 
points for cost of 
control system  
 
250 points + 
total share 
returns – 50 






The principal was endowed with 250 points in all conditions.  The principal received the 
total return from the 10 shares selected by the agent.  Because the principal chose to 
implement the control system, the principal paid 50 points.  The number of points the 
principal earned depended on the total return of the shares selected by the agent:  
Principal points = 250 points + total return on shares selected by the agent – cost of 
control system.  For example, suppose the total return of the 10 shares selected by the 
agent was 400.  The principal’s payoff will equal 250 + 400 – 50 = 600 points. 
7)  Answer Questions 
 Participants completed a series of questions to test their understanding of the two 
roles and the compensation schemes and were required to answer these questions 
correctly before continuing.   
8)  Make Contract Implementation (Principal) or Investment Decisions (Agents) 
 The principal randomly assigned participants to either a bonus or penalty control 
system that either included or did not include principal discretion.  The computer then 
informed agents of the principal’s decision. Agents then viewed the graphs and made 
investment decisions.  In order not to affect the Task 2 results, actual returns from Task 1 
were not made known to participants until after the end of Task 2.    
9)  Complete Task 1 Questionnaire  
 Agents used a 100-point Likert scale ranging from “not at all” to “a great deal” to 
indicate their perception of: 1) how fair their contracts were and 2) how disappointed they 
will be if they did not receive the bonus or had to pay the penalty (Hannan et al. 2005).   
Using the same scale, agents also specified how much: 1) the principal intruded into their 
decisions 2) they had decision-making autonomy 3) the principal questioned their 
66 
 
competence 4) the principal questioned their integrity 5) the principal trusted them and 6) 
they trusted the principal (Christ et al. 2012).  
4.3.4 Task 2 Procedures 
 The experimental procedure for Task 2 consisted of five steps. 
1)  Read Overview of Task 
Participants began with the points remaining from the first task but participants 
did not know their exact point totals.  They learned that they had at least 600 points 
remaining to complete Task 2.   
2)  Learn about Agent Investment Decision 
 Agents decided how many Horn shares to purchase (instead of Bell shares and 
Whistle shares).  Unlike Task 1, agents knew the return per Horn share for the next 
period (30 points per share) and agents were able to purchase from 0 to 50 Horn shares 
(instead of only one share) using their endowments.  The principal earned the returns 
from the Horn shares.  All participants learned that the principal was allowed to share any 
amount of the Horn investment returns with the agent.  
3)  Learn about Principal Pay Decision  
 The principal learned the number of shares the agent purchased and then decided 
how much to return to the agent.   
4)  Answer Questions 
 Participants completed a short series of questions to test their understanding of the 





5)  Make Horn Investment Decision  
 Agents decided how many Horn shares to purchase.  The computer notified the 
principal of the amount purchased by the agent.  The principal then used his discretion to 
decide how much to return to the agent.  Reciprocity theory suggests that the amount 
returned by the principal to the agent would be in proportion to the amount initially 
transferred by the agent to the principal (Falk & Fishbacher 2006).  
 After the completion of Task 2, the principal learned the total returns from Task 1 
for the agents assigned to the principal discretion experimental conditions.  The principal 
used his discretion to choose a target level between 400 and 600 points. Agents paid (did 
not pay) the penalty if their point total was below (above) the target level chosen by the 
principal in the penalty contract/principal discretion condition.  Agents did not receive 
(received) the bonus if their point total was below (above) the target level chosen by the 
principal in the bonus contract/principal discretion condition.   
 Participants then completed an exit questionnaire that included demographic and 
manipulation check questions.  Participants were paid and then dismissed.  
 Operationalization of the Independent Variables 
 The two independent variables, contract frame and principal discretion in agent 
performance evaluation, were manipulated between subjects.  All independent variables 
were explained in the initial instructions provided to the participants.  Participants were 
required to correctly answer questions to show their understanding before they continued 
the experiment.  
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4.4.1 Incentive Contract Frame 
 Incentive contract frame was manipulated by using either a contract frame that 
rewards agents who meet or exceed a certain performance target with a bonus (bonus 
contract) or a contract frame that penalizes agents who fail to meet a certain performance 
target with a penalty (penalty contract).  The study maintained economic equivalence 
across contract frame conditions.   
4.4.2 Principal Discretion in Agent Performance Evaluation 
 Principal discretion in agent performance evaluation was manipulated by using 
either an ex ante performance target (no principal discretion) or an ex post performance 
target set by the principal (principal discretion).  In the two no principal discretion 
conditions, the study used a performance target of 500 points to determine whether agents 
received a bonus or paid a penalty. In the two principal discretion conditions, the study 
allowed (but did not require) the principal to choose a performance target between 400 to 
600 points. The principal was allowed to make the adjustment after knowing the agent’s 
performance.  
 Consistent with how discretionary adjustments are used in practice, the study 
intentionally created ex ante uncertainty in two different ways.  First, the study informed 
participants that the principal was not required to adjust the performance target. This 
created uncertainty as to whether the principal would use discretion.  Second, the 
condition stated that the principal could select any performance target between 400 and 




4.4.3 Summary of Independent Variables 
 The following table summarizes the manipulations of the independent variables:  
 
Table 5: Operationalization of Independent Variables 
 
Independent Variable Manipulations  
 Contract 
Frame 
Bonus Contract -Agents receive a bonus of 150 points if 
performance meets or exceeds a 
performance target.  
 Penalty Contract -Agents pay a penalty of 150 points if 






-Performance target to determine bonus or 
penalty is set ex ante at 500 points  
 Principal 
Discretion  
-Principal chooses the performance target 
that determines whether agents receive a 
bonus or pay a penalty (between 400 – 
600) 
 
 Operationalization of the Dependent Variables 
 The study measured two dependent variables:  agent effort on the task under 
contract and agent effort on the task not under contract.  The following table summarizes 
the measurement of the dependent variables.   
Table 6: Operationalization of Dependent Variables 
 
Dependent Variables Operational Definition 
 Effort on Task Under Contract Total cost of all shares purchased in Task 1 
 Effort on Task Not Under 
Contract 
Total number of Horn investments purchased in Task 
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 Other Items in the Complete Theoretical Model 
 The complete theoretical model (see Figure 3) uses agents’ responses from the 
Task 1 Questionnaire as well as the total number of points earned by agents for each of 
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the two tasks.  All questions from the Task 1 Questionnaire used a 100-point Likert scale 
ranging from “not at all” to “a great deal.”  The following table summarizes the other 
items in the complete theoretical model:  
Table 7: Other Items in the Complete Theoretical Model   
 
Item Item Description 
 Perceived Fairness To what extent agents thought that their contracts 
were fair  
 Expected Disappointment To what extent agents thought they will be 
disappointed if they had to pay the penalty or did 
not receive the bonus 
 Perceived Autonomy To what extent agents felt that they had the 
autonomy to make decisions 
 Perceived Intrusion To what extent agents felt that the principal had 
intruded on agents’ decisions 
 Signal of Questioning 
Competence 
To what extent agents felt that the principal 
questioned agents’ competence 
 Signal of Questioning 
Integrity 
To what extent agents felt that the principal 
questioned agents’ integrity 
 Perceived Trust To what extent agents felt trusted by the principal  
 Reciprocal Trust To what extent agents trusted the principal 
 Performance on Task Under 
Contract 
Total number of points in Task 1 
 Performance on Task Not 
Under Contract 
Total number of points in Task 2 
 
 Chapter Summary 
 This chapter described the experimental design, the participants in the experiment, 
the experimental tasks and procedures, the operationalization of the independent and 
dependent variables and the other items in the complete theoretical model.   The 
experimental design combined the Hannan et al. (2005) and Christ et al. (2012) models 
and added principal discretion in agent performance evaluation. The first task of the 
experiment manipulated both the contract frame and the use of principal discretion.  The 
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principal paid agents using either a bonus or penalty contract and either did or did not 
have discretion to change the performance target which determined whether agents 
received a bonus or paid a penalty.  The second task was a modified trust game where 
pay was at the discretion of the principal.  The expected statistical tests that will be used 
to analyze the study’s four hypotheses and to test the complete theoretical model (see 




Chapter 5 Data Analysis and Results 
 
 Chapter Overview 
Section 5.2 explains the determination of the sample size and checks the data for 
random assignment, normality and equal variances.  Section 5.3 tests the four hypotheses 
generated in Chapter 3.  Section 5.4 tests the complete theoretical model as depicted in 
Figure 3.  Section 5.5 concludes with a summary of the results.    
 General Analysis 
 An a priori power analysis was conducted to determine the total sample size 
required for the study.  The effect sizes from both Hannan et al. (2005) and Christ et al. 
(2012) were used to estimate the effect size for the power analysis.  The effect size for 
Hannan et al. (2005) was medium (d =.55) and the effect size for Christ et al. (2012) was 
large (d =.77). When alpha is set at .05 along with a medium effect size for eta squared 
set at .0625 and power set at .80, it was determined that that a total sample size of 116 
was required for a MANOVA with four groups (i.e. n =29 pairs for each group).  
This study has two categorical independent variables, contract frame and principal 
discretion in agent performance evaluation and two continuous dependent variables, 
agent effort for the task under contract and agent effort for the task not under contract.  
Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) should be used to examine the relationship 
between categorical independent variables and two or more dependent variables (Huck 
1974) if the data meet three requirements:  1) random assignment of participants to the 
study conditions 2) all groups come from normal populations and 3) all groups come 
from populations with equal variances.  If the data fail to meet these requirements, then 
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nonparametric tests should be used.  The next two sections. 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 examine 
whether the data meet these three requirements. 
5.2.1 Random Assignment 
Participants randomly signed up for seven experiment sessions over two days.  
All four experimental conditions were run in each session.  Participant demographics 
were collected in the post-experimental questionnaire to assure that participants were 
randomly distributed across the four experimental conditions.  Not finding any 
differences in participant demographics across experimental conditions provides support 
to the assumption of random assignment.  The following table summarizes the mean 
responses by cell: 




















Age 20.3 20.8 20.0 21.2 .22 
Gender 1.50 1.64 1.57 1.35 .14 
Experience .68 1.25 .61 1.89 .21 
 
Experience is the number of years of full-time work experience.  Gender is coded 
“0” for male and “1” for female.  All demographic variables were not significantly 
different across cells.  This analysis suggests that the participants were randomly 
assigned to experimental treatments.  
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5.2.2 Compliance with ANOVA’s Normality and Equal Variance Assumptions 
The Shapiro-Wilk test was used to test whether the data for the two dependent 
variables come from populations with normal distributions.  The null-hypothesis of this 
test is that the population is normally distributed.  Therefore, if the p-value is greater than 
.05, the null hypothesis that the data come from a normally distributed population cannot 
be rejected.  The p-value for Effort on Task Under Contract,1.0, and Effort on Task Not 
Under Contract, .18, are both greater than .05.  This would suggest that the data come 
from a normally distributed population.   
The standard deviations across cells suggest that the variables meet the equal 
variances assumption. These statistics are in Table 9:  



















    






Effort on Task 
Not Under 
Contract 
14.74 14.58 18.20 15.81 
  
 
 Tests of Hypotheses 
This section examines whether each hypothesis was supported or not supported.   
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5.3.1 Effect of Contract Frame on Agent Effort for Task Under Contract 
In a contract setting without principal discretion, agent trust is not required for the 
task under contract because the incentive contract specifies the payout for each potential 
outcome.  Expected disappointment will be higher under a penalty contract than under a 
bonus contract. Therefore, agent effort on the task under contract will be greater under a 
penalty contract than under a bonus contract because greater expected disappointment 
will result in higher agent effort.  Hypothesis 1 states:   
H1:  Agent effort on the task under contract will be greater under a penalty 
contract than under a bonus contract. 
 
 
Table 10: Mean Effort on Task Under Contract by Experimental Condition 
  Contract Frame 
  Bonus Penalty 
Principal Discretion No 173.0 179.5 
 Yes 171.25 175.0 
  172.16 177.29 
 
Using a t-test, the mean effort on the task under contract in the penalty contract 
condition, 177.29, was significantly higher (t = 1.82, p = .03) than in the bonus contract 
condition, 172.16.  This result supports Hypothesis 1.  
5.3.2 Effect of Contract Frame and Principal Discretion on Agent Effort for Task 
Under Contract 
This subsection adds principal discretion in agent performance evaluation to the 
previous hypothesis from Section 5.3.1. The agent’s trust in the principal becomes 
important in the agent’s effort decision for the task under contract because the principal 
has discretion over the agent’s performance evaluation.  Attribution theory suggests that 
agents attribute negative (positive) personal qualities to the principal as a result of the 
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principal’s choice to implement a penalty (bonus) contract.  The attribution of negative 
(positive) personal qualities to the principal diminishes (increase) agent effort.  
The study’s second hypothesis follows:  
H2:  Principal discretion in agent performance evaluation will moderate the 
relationship between incentive contract and agent effort on the task under 
contract such that agent effort under a penalty (bonus) contract will be 
lower (higher) with principal discretion than without principal discretion. 
 
The mean effort on the task under contract in the bonus contract/no principal 
discretion condition, 173.0, was higher than in the bonus contract/principal discretion 
condition, 171.25.  Also, the mean effort on the task under contract in the penalty 
contract/no principal discretion condition, 179.5, was higher than in the penalty 
contract/principal discretion condition, 175.  Although the difference was in the correct 
direction for the penalty contract conditions, the difference was not in the correct 
direction for the bonus contract conditions.  The overall differences are not statistically 













Table 11: Effect of Frame and Discretion on Effort for Task Under Contract 
 



















Prob > F 
Model 3 1113.558 371.186 1.5931 0.1950 
Error 113 26328.750 232.998   
C. Total 116 27442.308    
 















Prob > F 
Frame 1 767.6432 3.2946 0.0722 
Discretion 1 285.4117 1.2250 0.2707 
Frame*Discretion 1 55.2570 0.2372 0.6272 
 
One reason for this result may be that the effort measure, Effort on Task Under 
Contract, did not provide enough variance to show different levels of effort.  The number 
of points used to purchase Bell and Whistle shares were grouped mainly around only five 
amounts, 205, 190, 175, 160 and 145.  Five levels may not have been enough to show 
significant effort differences across four different experimental conditions. The frequency 
for each level of Effort on Task Under Contract is shown in the following table: 
Table 12: Distribution Count of Effort for Task Under Contract 
Points Frequency Percent 
130 1 .85 
145 6 5.13 
160 30 25.64 
175 44 37.61 
190 30 25.64 
205 5 4.27 
220 1 .85 
Total 117 100.00 
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5.3.3 Effect of Contract Frame on Agent Effort for Task Not Under Contract 
In a setting in which the incentive contract does not govern all tasks for which the 
agent is responsible, the agent’s trust in the principal becomes important in the agent’s 
effort decision for the task not under contract.  This setting requires trust because the 
principal has discretion over the agent’s compensation for the ungoverned task.  A 
penalty (bonus) contract leads to lower (higher) perceived fairness, higher (lower) 
expected disappointment, higher (lower) levels of perceived intrusion and lower (higher) 
levels of perceived autonomy. These effects lead to lower (higher) reciprocal trust and 
lower (higher) effort.     
 This leads to the study’s third hypothesis:  
H3: Agent effort on the task not under contract will be greater under a bonus 
contract than under a penalty contract.   
 
 
Table 13: Mean Effort on Task Not Under Contract by Experimental Condition 
  Contract Frame 
  Bonus Penalty 
Principal Discretion No 28.23 27.30 
 Yes 32.32 27.38 
  30.21 27.34 
 
Using a t-test, the mean effort on the task not under contract in the bonus contract 
condition, 30.21, was not significantly higher (t = -.98, p = .16) than in the penalty 
contract condition, 27.34.  This result does not support Hypothesis 3.  
Loss aversion may explain the lack of support for Hypothesis 3.  A significant 
discrepancy exists between participants in the penalty contract and bonus contract 
conditions who chose the highest effort level for the Task not under Contract (50 horn 
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shares).  Participants who chose this highest level of effort were 25% of the total number 
of participants.  Participants in the bonus contract condition had significantly higher 
Reciprocal Trust and significantly lower Expected Disappointment than participants who 
chose the highest effort level in the penalty contract condition.  These results suggest that 
participants in the penalty contract condition who chose the highest effort level may have 
thought that choosing a higher effort level would result in a higher return.    
5.3.4 Effect of Contract Frame and Principal Discretion on Agent Effort for Task 
Not Under Contract 
This subsection now adds principal discretion in agent performance evaluation to 
the setting discussed in Section 5.3.3.  The agent’s trust in the principal is important in 
the agent’s effort decision for the task not under contract because the principal has 
discretion over both the agent’s performance evaluation and the agent’s compensation for 
the ungoverned task. Attribution theory suggests that agents would attribute negative 
(positive) personal qualities to the principal as a result of the principal’s choice to 
implement a penalty (bonus) contract.  The attribution of negative (positive) personal 
qualities to the principal would diminish (increase) agent effort.   
The study’s last hypothesis follows:  
H4:  Principal discretion in agent performance evaluation will moderate the 
relationship between incentive contract and agent effort on the task not 
under contract such that agent effort under a penalty (bonus) contract will 
be lower (higher) with principal discretion than without principal discretion.  
 
 The mean effort on Task Not Under Contract was higher in the bonus 
contract/principal discretion condition, 32.3, than in the bonus contract/no principal 
discretion condition, 28.23. Also, the mean effort on Task Not Under Contract was nearly 
the same in the penalty contract/principal discretion condition, 27.38, as compared to the 
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penalty contract/no principal discretion condition, 27.30. Although the difference was in 
the correct direction for the bonus contract conditions, the difference was not in the 
correct direction for the penalty contract conditions.  The overall differences were not 
statistically significant (F = .64, p = .59) and Hypothesis 4 is not supported.  
Table 14: Effect of Frame and Discretion on Effort for Task Not Under Contract 
 



















Prob > F 
Model 3 482.698 160.899 .6348 0.5941 
Error 113 28642.601 253.474   
C. Total 116 29125.299    
 















Prob > F 
Frame 1 252.2285 0.9951 0.3206 
Discretion 1 126.8946 0.5006 0.4807 
Frame*Discretion 1 117.4187 0.4632 0.4975 
 
One reason for the lack of support for Hypothesis 4 is similar to the reason for 
Hypothesis 3.  In the group of participants who chose the highest effort level for Task 
Not Under Contract (50 horn shares), Expected Disappointment was significantly higher 
in the penalty contract/principal discretion condition than in the penalty contract/no 
principal discretion condition. Participants may have thought that choosing a higher 
effort level would result in a higher return.  Choosing the highest effort level may have 
been an attempt to recoup expected financial losses from the first task.   
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 Test of Complete Theoretical Model 
To further assess the underlying reason for why effort is different between the 
penalty and bonus contract frame conditions, the study uses path analysis with structural 
equation modeling methodology (SEM) to estimate the model found in Figure 3.  The 
study also uses path analysis with structural equation modeling methodology (SEM) to 
assess whether contract frame and principal discretion interact and how the interaction 
affects any of the variables found in the model.   




Table 15 provides descriptive statistics for all of the variables in the complete 
model as depicted in Figure 3:   
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aEffort on Task Under Contract is measured using the number of points participants used 
to purchase Bell and Whistle shares during Task 1 of the experiment. 
bEffort on Task Not Under Contract is measured using the number of Horn shares 
participants purchased during Task 2 of the experiment.  
cParticipants answered the following questions using a 100-point Likert scale (0 = not at 
all to 100 = a significant amount): 
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 To what extent do you feel that Participant B’s control system is fair? 
(Perceived Fairness) 
 To what extent would you be disappointed if you did not receive the bonus or 
had to pay the penalty?  (Expected Disappointment) 
 To what extent do you feel that Participant B has intruded on your decisions? 
(Perceived Intrusion) 
 To what extent do you feel that you have the autonomy to make decisions? 
(Perceived Autonomy) 
 To what extent do you feel that Participant B questions your competence? 
(Signal of Questioning Competence) 
 To what extent do you feel that Participant B questions your integrity? (Signal 
of Questioning Integrity) 
 To what extent do you feel that Participant B trusts you? (Perceived Trust) 
 To what extent do you trust Participant B (Reciprocal Trust) 
To assess the data for the complete model, the study uses the Shapiro-Wilk test to 
test for the normality of the data.  The test shows that the data for all of the variables are 
not distributed normally except for Effort on Task Under Contract, Effort on Task Not 
Under Contract and Reciprocal Trust.  The study transforms the data for all of the 
variables using a log transformation.   
To assess whether the data fits the complete model, the study uses a goodness of 
fit test. The Comparative Fit Index (CFI) indicates the relative improvement in fit of the 
model compared to the null model (Kline 2005).  The Comparative Fit Index for the 
complete model is .92 which is above the recommended minimum value of .90 or greater 
(Kline 2005).  The fit of the complete model is confirmed with the Root Mean Square 
Error of Approximation test. The Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) 
is related to residuals in the model (Kline 2005). RMSEA values range from 0 to 1 with a 
smaller RMSEA value indicating a better fit.  RMSEA for the complete model is .05 
which is below the acceptable maximum of .06 (Kline 2005).  Thus, the model provides a 
good fit for the data.   
84 
 
The standardized path coefficients and statistical significance for the complete 
model are presented in Figure 9:3  
 
Figure 9: Test of Full Model:  Interaction of Contract Frame and Principal 
Discretion 
 
Results indicate that there is an interaction between principal discretion and 
contract frame and this interaction has a significant effect on Perceived Fairness. 
Specifically, Perceived Fairness is significantly lower for the penalty contract/no 
principal discretion condition as compared to the bonus contract/no principal discretion 
(-.37, p < .01). When principal discretion is included, Perceived Fairness is not 
significantly different between the penalty contract/principal discretion and bonus 
contract/principal discretion conditions (-.04, p = .70).  Path analysis confirms that the 
                                                 
3 To test for the interaction between contract frame and principal discretion, the study estimates the model 
for two groups: no principal discretion and principal discretion. Each of the four hypothesized interactions 
contain two standardized path coefficients, one for each group. The first coefficient is the coefficient for the 
no principal discretion group and the second coefficient is for the principal discretion group.  
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effect of Contract Frame on Effort on Task Under Contract, as discussed in Section 5.3.1, 
occurs through Perceived Fairness. Contract Frame is negatively associated with 
Perceived Fairness (-.37, p < .01).  Perceived Fairness is negatively associated with Effort 
on Task Under Contract (-.20, p < .01). The combination of these paths demonstrates that 
Effort on Task Under Contract is higher under a penalty contract than under a bonus 
contract.  
 Path analysis also shows that the effect of Contract Frame on Reciprocal Trust 
occurs through Perceived Fairness.  Perceived Fairness is positively associated with 
Perceived Trust (.21, p < .01).  Perceived Trust is positively associated with Reciprocal 
Trust (.66, p < .01).  The combination of these two paths shows that Perceived Trust is 
lower (higher) under a penalty (bonus) contract frame than under a bonus (penalty) 
contract frame.   
In sum, the interaction between contract frame and principal discretion impacts 
the perceived fairness of the contract.  Principal discretion has a significant positive effect 
on perceived fairness only under a penalty contract. The results also show that principal 
discretion eliminates the differences in perceived fairness between a bonus contract and a 
penalty contract.   
Also, effort on a task under a penalty contract is higher than effort on a task under 
a bonus contract. Contrary to prior research, the higher effort under a penalty contract is a 
result of how agents view the perceived fairness of their contract rather than through the 
effect of expected disappointment (Hannan et al. 2005).   
Results also show that a penalty contract has a negative effect on the trust 
environment and this effect lowers perceived trust and reciprocal trust.  In contrast to 
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prior research, the negative effect of a penalty contract occurs through how agents view 
the fairness of their contract rather than through the signaling effect found in Christ et al. 
(2012).    
 Summary of Results 
This section discusses the results of the test of the hypotheses and the results of 
the path analysis.  The results of the test of the hypotheses are listed in the following 
table:   
Table 16: Summary of Results of Tests of Hypotheses 
 Effect of Contract Frame on Agent Effort for Task Under 
Contract  
 
H1: Agent effort on the task under contract will be greater under a 
penalty contract than under a bonus contract.  
Supported 
   
 Effect of Contract Frame and Principal Discretion on Agent 
Effort for Task Under Contract  
 
H2: Principal discretion in agent performance evaluation will moderate 
the relationship between incentive contract and agent effort on the 
task under contract such that agent effort under a penalty (bonus) 
contract will be lower (higher) with principal discretion than 
without principal discretion. 
Not 
Supported 
   
 Effect of Contract Frame on Agent Effort for Task Not Under 
Contract 
 
H3: Agent effort on the task not under contract will be greater under a 
bonus contract than under a penalty contract.   
Not 
Supported 
   
 Effect of Contract Frame and Principal Discretion on Agent 
Effort for Task Not Under Contract 
 
H4: Principal discretion in agent performance evaluation will moderate 
the relationship between incentive contract and agent effort on the 
task not under contract such that agent effort under a penalty 
(bonus) contract will be lower (higher) with principal discretion 
than without principal discretion. 
Not 
Supported 
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Agent effort on the task under contract was significantly greater in the penalty 
contract condition than in the bonus contract condition. This result supports Hypothesis 
1.   
Agent effort on the task under contract in the penalty contract/principal discretion 
condition was not significantly lower than in the penalty contract/no principal discretion 
condition.  Also, agent effort on the task under contract in the bonus contract/principal 
discretion condition was not significantly higher than in the bonus contract/no principal 
discretion condition.  These results do not support Hypothesis 2.   
Agent effort on the task not under contract was not significantly greater in the 
bonus contract condition than in the penalty contract condition.  Hypothesis 3 is not 
supported.   
 Agent effort on the task not under contract was not significantly lower in the 
penalty contract/principal discretion condition than in the penalty contract/no principal 
discretion condition.  Also, agent effort on the task not under contract was not 
significantly higher in the bonus contract/principal discretion condition than in the bonus 
contract/no principal discretion condition.  These results do not support Hypothesis 4.  
Structural equations-based path analysis of the complete model (see Figure 9) 
shows that the interaction between contract frame and principal discretion affects 
perceived fairness.  Further analysis of the model indicates that effort for a task under 
contract is higher under a penalty contract than under a bonus contract.  Also, perceived 
trust and reciprocal trust are lower under a penalty contract than under a bonus contract.  




Chapter 6 Summary 
 Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides a summary of the results and discusses their implications 
and limitations.  Section 6.2 summarizes the research questions and the findings of the 
study.  Section 6.3 explains the limitations of the study.  Section 6.4 suggests areas for 
future research. 
 Summary and Implications 
6.2.1 Summary 
The design of incentive compensation plans is critical to a company’s success.  
An incentive contract can be framed as either a bonus that rewards agents for achieving 
certain performance goals or as a penalty that decreases compensation if agents fail to 
meet performance goals. The effect of bonuses and penalties on agent effort remains 
unclear because prior research shows varied results that depend not only on the 
contractual setting but also on how effort is measured.  In a contract setting without 
principal discretion, agent effort on a task under contract was higher under penalty 
contracts than under bonus contracts (Hannan et al. 2005). However, in a contract setting 
with principal discretion, bonus contracts induce greater effort than penalty contracts on a 
subsequent task not under contract (Christ et al. 2012).  A number of differences between 
these two studies exist that make the results difficult to compare.  
This study combines the two models from prior literature to examine the means 
by which incentive contract framing affects effort.  This study uses an experiment to vary 
both the incentive contract frame and the two contract settings within the same study.  
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This study then examines the effect of this manipulation on the two different effort 
measures.  As a result, this study addresses the need to understand the underlying 
mechanisms for how incentive contract framing affects agent effort.  
Principal discretion in agent performance evaluation is commonly used with 
incentive contracts in practice.  Principal discretion in agent performance evaluation 
means that principals use subjective judgment rather than objective measures to assess 
agent performance.  Prior research suggests that principal discretion can have either 
positive or negative effects on agent effort.  Principal discretion may increase agent effort 
because principal discretion reduces compensation risk and improves incentive alignment 
(Bol 2008).  Alternatively, principal discretion may decrease agent effort because 
principal discretion may introduce bias that can blur the link between pay and 
performance (Bol 2008; Bol et al. 2011).   
The joint effect of incentive contract frame and principal discretion in agent 
performance evaluation on agent effort, however, has not been studied. The question 
remains as to whether the effect of principal discretion on agent effort varies according to 
the contract frame. This study uses the new model to examine whether and how incentive 
contract framing and principal discretion interact to impact agent effort.  This study 
predicts that agents will interpret the use of principal discretion in agent performance 
evaluation differently under a penalty contract than under a bonus contract and that their 
interpretation will affect their effort. 
This study, however, does not find the predicted interaction of incentive contract 
frame and principal discretion on agent effort.  Specifically, the use of the penalty 
contract (bonus) contract frame with principal discretion did not lead to a significantly 
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lower (higher) level of effort than the use of the penalty (bonus) contract frame without 
principal discretion.  Not finding the expected interaction may be due to a weak measure 
for effort. Therefore, the lack of results due to a weak measure would not necessarily 
affect finding other results.    
Importantly, this study finds an interaction between principal discretion in agent 
performance evaluation and contract frame. Results of an experiment show that the 
interaction of principal discretion and contract frame influences how agents view the 
perceived fairness of their incentive contract.  Specifically, principal discretion increases 
perceived fairness under a penalty contract frame but not under a bonus contract frame. 
The results of this study also show that the use of principal discretion eliminates the 
differences in perceived fairness between a bonus contract and a penalty contract.   
This results of this study suggest that the use of principal discretion in agent 
evaluation is more important when an outcome is unfavorable than when an outcome is 
favorable. Under a favorable outcome such as a bonus contract, people are less likely to 
seek additional information to make sense of their situation because the situation is 
favorable.  When an outcome is unfavorable such as a penalty contract, people seek 
additional information to make sense of their situation.  The level of procedural fairness 
provides information that can make sense of the situation.  Principal discretion can 
improve procedural fairness because principals can use their discretion to adjust for the 
effects of uncontrollable events.  Principal discretion then improves perceived fairness 
especially under an unfavorable outcome such as a penalty contract.    
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This study also extends prior research by showing that perceived fairness is 
critical for understanding how incentive contract frame affects effort and trust.  The 
results of this study suggest that perceived fairness explains how contract frame affects 
effort across the different contract settings of the Hannan et al. (2005) and Christ et al. 
(2012) models.  Specifically, perceived fairness provides not only the primary link 
between contract frame and effort on a task under contract in Hannan et al. (2005) but 
also the primary link between contract frame and trust in Christ et al. (2012).   
The results of this study document that perceived fairness is the primary path by 
which contract frame affects effort on a task under contract. The study finds that effort on 
a task under contract was greater under a penalty contract than under a bonus contract. 
The primary path by which this occurs, however, is not expected disappointment (Hannan 
et al. 2005) but perceived fairness.  Perceived fairness is lower under a penalty contract 
than under a bonus contract.  Effort on the task under contract is negatively associated 
with perceived fairness.  The results suggest that the unfairness of the penalty contract 
increases the desire to avoid paying the penalty. This increased desire to avoid paying the 
penalty results in higher effort on the task under a penalty contract than under a bonus 
contract.      
The results of this study also show that perceived fairness is the primary path by 
which contract frame affects trust.  The study finds that perceived trust is higher under a 
bonus contract than under a penalty contract. The primary path by which this occurs, 
however, is not the signaling path of Christ et al. (2012) but the path of perceived 
fairness.  Perceived fairness is higher under a bonus contract.  Perceived trust is 
positively associated with perceived fairness.  The results of this study, then, show that 
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perceived fairness explains not only how contract frame affects effort on the task under 
contract but also how contract frame affects trust.    
6.2.2 Implications 
Improving how agents view contracts is important for managers who design and 
implement incentive contracts. These results suggest that principal discretion in agent 
performance evaluation offsets the perceived lack of fairness of penalty contracts.  
Increasing the perceived fairness of penalty contracts will help managers to design better 
incentive compensation plans.   
The results of this study contribute to the incentive contract framing literature by 
documenting that principal discretion in agent performance evaluation changes the 
perceived unfairness of penalty contracts.  Prior literature shows that agents view bonus 
contracts as fairer than penalty contracts (Hannan et al. 2005).  However, this study 
shows that the use of principal discretion increases the perceived fairness of a penalty 
contract to nearly the same level as a bonus contract.  
The results of this study also contribute to a second stream of literature that 
examines principal discretion in agent performance evaluation.  This literature documents 
various benefits and costs of principal discretion and generally focuses on the principal’s 
decision to use discretion.  By contrast, the results of this study show the effects of 
principal discretion on agents.  Specifically, the results show that principal discretion in 
agent performance evaluation could significantly reduce the differences in perceived 
fairness between a bonus contract and a penalty contract.   
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 Limitations of the Study 
The study used a computerized laboratory setting that was designed to improve 
the study’s internal validity.  This setting, however, creates several potential limitations 
regarding the study’s external validity.   
The first limitation to generalizability is the use of student participants. Student 
participants may react differently than employees who are have prior experience with 
contracts or principal discretion in agent performance evaluation.  A second threat to 
external validity is the process used to introduce principal discretion.  The process takes 
place anonymously so that participants are not permitted contact with the principal.  The 
experiment did this to control for reputation effects that are outside the scope of this 
study.  A third limitation is that the financial incentives for the study are not in proportion 
to financial incentives found in a real world setting.  The pay incentives were designed to 
be consistent with past research (Christ et al. 2012) so that insights from this study could 
be interpreted incrementally.   
In conclusion, this study is not designed to be directly generalizable to a real 
world incentive compensation context.  The contribution of the study is to show the 
effects of manipulating only the use of principal discretion in agent performance 
evaluation and incentive contract frame on agent perceived fairness.   
 Future Research Directions 
The results of this study suggest several avenues for future research.  First, the 
study did not find the expected effect of the interaction between principal discretion in 
agent performance evaluation and contract frame on agent effort for a task under contract.  
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The measure for effort on the task under contract did not provide enough variance to 
measure effort for the task under a contract.  Future research could determine whether 
and how an interaction between principal discretion and contract frame affects agent 
effort on the task under contract by improving the measure used to determine the effort 
on the task under contract.     
Second, the study was not able to determine whether an interaction between 
principal discretion in agent performance evaluation and contract frame affects effort for 
the task not under contract.  Loss aversion may have contributed to the mixed results.   
Future research could determine whether and how an interaction between principal 
discretion and contract frame affects agent effort for a task not under contract by 
exploring other kinds of tasks not under contract.  
Third, this study employed an experiment with a single period.  Although the 
results show that principal discretion improves agent perceived fairness of a penalty 
contract, it is unclear whether this benefit would continue if the principal and agents 
engaged in a multi-period experiment.  Future research could examine whether the joint 
effect of principal discretion and incentive contract frame continues to influence agent 
perceived fairness even after the principal responds to the agent in the next period.    
Finally, the study introduced principal discretion with the use of an ex-post 
adjustment to an objective performance measure.  However, prior literature suggests that 
other types of principal discretion are common in practice (Hoppe and Moers 2011).  
Future research could explore whether different kinds of principal discretion would have 
the same effect found in the current study.       
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Appendix A:  Experimental Materials 
Part 1 Instructions 
 





Please do not use your browser's back button at any time. 
 
 
Please click the "Next" button to continue. 
 





You are about to participate in a study on decision making.  Please read the instructions 
carefully because the amount of money you earn will depend in part on your 
decisions. Also there will be several short quizzes on these instructions to ensure your 
understanding, and you will not be able to continue until you accurately complete the 
quizzes, so please pay close attention.   
 
Please turn off cell phones and similar devices now. 
  
Please do not talk at all during this experiment.   
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the Administrator will answer 








Overview of the Study 
  
This is a computerized decision making study.  We expect the entire session to last 
approximately 60 minutes, during which time you will be required to answer questions 




In this study, you will assume the role of Participant A. You will be matched with 
someone else in the room who will assume the role of Participant B. You will not be told 
who you are paired with either during or after the study.   
  
You will earn points which can be affected by decisions made by you and/or the person 
with whom you are paired. These points will be converted to cash and you will be paid 
the cash amount before you leave today. Points will be converted to cash using the 
following formula: 
  
US $ Payment = (Points earned x .025). 
  
 If you earn 200 points, you will receive US $5.00 
 If you earn 500 points, you will receive US $12.50 
 If you earn 1000 points, you will receive US $25.00 
 
  









As a first step, you will have the task of selecting a portfolio of investments for 
Participant B. That is, Participant B will earn the returns from the portfolio, but you will 
choose the specific investments to be included in the portfolio. You will also pay for the 
investments, but will be given a fund from which to pay.  
  
More specifically, at the start of the study,  
 You will be given 850 points and  
 Participant B will be given 250 points.   
Your initial fund is larger because you must pay for the investments and Participant B 
will receive the returns from the investments.  
  
The following instructions will describe in detail the decisions made by you and 









You have the task of selecting the portfolio of investments.  You will be presented with 
30 possible investments. From these 30 investment choices, you must select and pay for 
1 share each of 10 of these investments, which will earn points for Participant 
B. Participant B will hold the shares for one period only and so Participant B's returns 
will be maximized if you select the 10 shares that are expected to make the highest 
returns in the next period.   
  
NOTE: You must select 10 different investments and buy exactly one share each 




Please click the "Next" button to continue 
 
There are two types of investments, BELL investments and WHISTLE investments.  The 
cost per share depends on the investment type.  
 Each BELL share selected will cost you 10 points.  
 Each WHISTLE share selected will cost you 25 points.  
WHISTLE shares are more expensive because on average they are expected to return 
more per share in the next period than BELL shares. Specifically, BELL shares will earn 
an average return of 20 points per share, whereas WHISTLE shares will earn an average 
return of 50 points per share.  
  
Importantly, this is only an average and any individual investment can earn considerably 
more or less than the average (as you can see by looking at the graphical representations 
of the investment return history which are provided to you on the large, folded documents 
and described on the laminated document next to your keyboard).  
  
Please take a moment to review the laminated document. Click the "Next" button after 
you have read the information on the laminated document.  
  
Participant B will have the opportunity to implement a control system prior to your 
investment decision. The control system, if implemented, establishes a bonus system in 
which you will receive an extra 150 points if the total return of all shares chosen by you 
is greater than or equal to 500 points. You will not receive any bonus points if the total 
return is less than 500 points. The bonus will be paid from the administrator's fund.  That 




After Participant B decides whether or not to implement a control system, you will be 
notified of this decision.  
 
 
Please click the "Next" button to continue.  
 
Your Summary of Points  
  
You will receive an initial fund of 850 points. From this fund, you will pay for the 10 
shares you have selected (10 points for each BELL share and 25 points for each 
WHISTLE share). Further, the points will depend on whether or not Participant B chose 
to implement a control system and, if a control system has been implemented, the total 






For example, suppose Participant B implements the control system and you choose 6 
BELL shares and 4 WHISTLE shares.  Also assume that the returns for these investments 
equal or exceed 500 points.  Your payoff will equal 850 - (6 x 10) - (4 x 25) + 150 = 840 
points.  
  
If Participant B does not implement the control system or the returns for the investments 
are less than 500, your payoff will equal 850 - (6 x 10) - (4 x 25) = 690 points.  
  
  




Participant B will receive the total return from the 10 (ten) shares chosen by 
you. Participant B will have the opportunity to implement a control system prior to your 
investment decision. The control system, if implemented, establishes a bonus system for 
you.  
  No Control System Control System 
Total Share 
Returns 
< 500  
850 points - Cost of 
Shares 
 





850 points - Cost of 
Shares 
 










Summary of Points - Participant B 
  
The total number of points that Participant B earns will depend on the total return of the 
shares chosen by you, and whether or not Participant B chose to implement a control 







Returns < 500  
250 points + total 
share returns 
250 points + total share returns - 50 
points for cost of control system 
Total Share 
Returns >=500 
250 points + total 
share returns 
250 points + total share returns - 50 






Please click the "Next" button to continue.   
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Bonus No Discretion Choose Investments 
Please wait to see whether Participant B has chosen to implement a control system. Your 
computer will go to a different screen when Participant B responds.  
While you are waiting, please take a few moments to review the graphical representations 
of the investment histories for the possible investments.  
Participant B HAS imposed a control system that provides you with a 150-point bonus if 
your investments yield a return >= 500 points.  
 
Your task is to choose 10 investment projects to invest in from the 30 
investments.  Please review the graphical representations of the investment histories for 
the possible investments. Then write down your 10 choices using the provided paper and 
pencil.   
 
After you click the "Next" button, you will have the opportunity to enter your selections.   
 





Please select 10 investment projects to invest in from the 30 investments listed below. To 
see the entire list of projects, please scroll down until you see the "Next" button. When 
you are finished, please click the "Next" button. 
 
       BELL (10 points each)                                        WHISTLE (25 points each) 
 
Investment Project A 
 
Investment Project P 
 
Investment Project B 
 
Investment Project Q 
 
Investment Project C 
 
Investment Project R 
 
Investment Project D 
 
Investment Project S 
 
Investment Project E 
 
Investment Project T 
 
Investment Project F 
 
Investment Project U 
 
Investment Project G 
 
Investment Project V 
 
Investment Project H 
 
Investment Project W 
 
Investment Project I 
 
Investment Project X 
 
Investment Project J 
 
Investment Project Y 
 
Investment Project K 
 
Investment Project Z 
 
Investment Project L 
 
Investment Project AA 
 
Investment Project M 
 
Investment Project BB 
 
Investment Project N 
 
Investment Project CC 
 
Investment Project O 
 









As a first step, you will have the task of selecting a portfolio of investments for 
Participant B. That is, Participant B will earn the returns from the portfolio, but you will 
choose the specific investments to be included in the portfolio. You will also pay for the 
investments, but will be given a fund from which to pay.  
  
More specifically, at the start of the study,  
 You will be given 850 points and  
 Participant B will be given 250 points.   
Your initial fund is larger because you must pay for the investments and Participant B 
will receive the returns from the investments.  
  
The following instructions will describe in detail the decisions made by you and 
Participant B. 
 
Please click the "Next" button to continue.  
Your Task 
  
You have the task of selecting the portfolio of investments. You will be presented with 30 
possible investments. From these 30 investment choices, you must select and pay for 1 
share each of 10 of these investments, which will earn points for Participant 
B. Participant B will hold the shares for one period only and so Participant B's returns 
will be maximized if you select the 10 shares that are expected to make the highest 




NOTE: You must select 10 different investments and buy exactly one share each 
of these investments. 
 
Please click the "Next" button to continue.  
 
There are two types of investments, BELL investments and WHISTLE investments.  The 
cost per share depends on the investment type.  
 Each BELL share selected will cost you 10 points.  
 Each WHISTLE share selected will cost you 25 points.  
WHISTLE shares are more expensive because on average they are expected to return 
more per share in the next period than BELL shares. Specifically, BELL shares will earn 
an average return of 20 points per share, whereas WHISTLE shares will earn an average 
return of 50 points per share.  
  
Importantly, this is only an average and any individual investment can earn considerably 
more or less than the average (as you can see by looking at the graphical representations 
of the investment return history which are provided to you on the large, folded documents 
and described on the laminated document next to your keyboard).  
  
Please take a moment to review the laminated document. Click the "Next" button after 
you have read the information on the laminated document.  
 
 
Please click the "Next" button to continue.  
  
Participant B will have the opportunity to implement a control system prior to your 
investment decision. The control system, if implemented, establishes a bonus system for 
you in which you will receive an extra 150 points if the total return of all shares chosen 
by you meets or exceeds the performance target set by Participant B (between 400 - 
600 points). You will not receive any bonus points if the total return is less than the 
performance target set by Participant B. The bonus will be paid from the administrator's 
fund. That is, the bonus will not be deducted from Participant B's fund.  
 
After Participant B decides whether or not to implement a control system, you will be 




Please click the "Next" button to continue.  
Your Summary of Points 
You will receive an initial fund of 850 points. From this fund, you will pay for the 10 
shares you have selected (10 points for each BELL share and 25 points for each 
WHISTLE share). Further, the points will depend on whether or not Participant B chose 
to implement a control system and, if a control system has been implemented, the total 







Total Share Returns < Target set by 
Participant B (between 400 - 600 
points) 
850 points - 
Cost of Shares 
 
850 points - Cost of 
Shares 
  
Total Share Returns >= Target set 
by Participant B (between 400 - 600 
points) 
850 points - 
Cost of Shares 
 
850 points - Cost of 




For example, suppose Participant B implements the control system and you choose 6 
BELL shares and 4 WHISTLE shares.  Also assume that the returns for these investments 
equal or exceed the performance target set by Participant B.  Your payoff will equal 850 - 
(6 x 10) - (4 x 25) + 150 = 840 points.  
  
If Participant B does not implement the control system or the returns for the investments 
are less than the performance target set by Participant B, your payoff will equal 850 - (6 x 
10) - (4 x 25) = 690 points.  
 





Participant B will receive the total return from the 10 (ten) shares chosen by 
you. Participant B will have the opportunity to implement a control system prior to your 
investment decision. The control system, if implemented, establishes a bonus system for 
you.  
 
If Participant B chooses to implement a control system, the cost to Participant B is 50 
points 
 
Summary of Points - Participant B 
The total number of points that Participant B earns will depend on the total return of the 
shares chosen by you, and whether or not Participant B chose to implement a control 





Total Share Returns < Target 
set by Participant B (between 
400 - 600 points) 
250 points + 
total share 
returns 
250 points + total share 
returns - 50 points for cost 
of control system 
Total Share Returns >= Target 
set by Participant B (between 
400 - 600 points) 
250 points + 
total share 
returns 
250 points + total share 
returns - 50 points for cost 




Please click the "Next" button to continue.   
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Bonus Discretion Choose Investments 
Please wait to see whether Participant B has chosen to implement a control system. Your 
computer will go to a different screen when Participant B responds.  
  
While you are waiting, please take a few moments to review the graphical representations 
of the investment histories for the possible investments.  
 
Participant B HAS imposed a control system that provides you with a 150-point bonus if 
your investments yield a return >= the performance target set by Participant B (between 
400 - 600 points).  
 
Your task is to choose 10 investment projects to invest in from the 30 
investments.  Please review the graphical representations of the investment histories for 
the possible investments. Then write down your 10 choices using the provided paper and 
pencil.   
 
After you click the "Next" button, you will have the opportunity to enter your selections.   
 





Please select 10 investment projects to invest in from the 30 investments listed below. To 
see the entire list of projects, please scroll down until you see the "Next" button. When 
you are finished, please click the "Next" button. 
 
   BELL (10 points each)                                              WHISTLE (25 points each) 
 
Investment Project A 
 
Investment Project P 
 
Investment Project B 
 
Investment Project Q 
 
Investment Project C 
 
Investment Project R 
 
Investment Project D 
 
Investment Project S 
 
Investment Project E 
 
Investment Project T 
 
Investment Project F 
 
Investment Project U 
 
Investment Project G 
 
Investment Project V 
 
Investment Project H 
 
Investment Project W 
 
Investment Project I 
 
Investment Project X 
 
Investment Project J 
 
Investment Project Y 
 
Investment Project K 
 
Investment Project Z 
 
Investment Project L 
 
Investment Project AA 
 
Investment Project M 
 
Investment Project BB 
 
Investment Project N 
 
Investment Project CC 
 
Investment Project O 
 









As a first step, you will have the task of selecting a portfolio of investments for 
Participant B. That is, Participant B will earn the returns from the portfolio, but you will 
choose the specific investments to be included in the portfolio. You will also pay for the 
investments, but will be given a fund from which to pay.  
  
More specifically, at the start of the study,  
 You will be given 1000 points and  
 Participant B will be given 250 points.   
Your initial fund is larger because you must pay for the investments and Participant B 
will receive the returns from the investments.  
  
The following instructions will describe in detail the decisions made by you and 
Participant B.  
 




You have the task of selecting the portfolio of investments.  You will be presented with 
30 possible investments. From these 30 investment choices, you must select and pay for 
1 share each of 10 of these investments, which will earn points for Participant 
B. Participant B will hold the shares for one period only and so Participant B's returns 
will be maximized if you selects the 10 shares that are expected to make the highest 
returns in the next period.   
  
NOTE: You must select 10 different investments and buy exactly one share each 
of these investments.  
 
Please click the "Next" button to continue.  
  
  
There are two types of investments, BELL investments and WHISTLE investments.  The 
cost per share depends on the investment type.  
 Each BELL share selected will cost you 10 points.  
 Each WHISTLE share selected will cost you 25 points.  
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WHISTLE shares are more expensive because on average they are expected to return 
more per share in the next period than BELL shares. Specifically, BELL shares will earn 
an average return of 20 points per share, whereas WHISTLE shares will earn an average 
return of 50 points per share.  
  
Importantly, this is only an average and any individual investment can earn considerably 
more or less than the average (as you can see by looking at the graphical representations 
of the investment return history which are provided to you on the large, folded documents 
and described on the laminated document next to your keyboard).  
  
Please take a moment to review the laminated document. Click the "Next" button after 
you have read the information on the laminated document.  
 
Please click the "Next" button to continue.  
  
Participant B will have the opportunity to implement a control system prior to your 
investment decision.  The control system, if implemented, establishes a penalty 
system in which you will pay 150 points if the total return of all shares chosen by you is 
less than 500 points. You will not have to pay any penalty points if the total return is 
greater than or equal to 500 points. The penalty will be paid to the administrator's fund. 
That is, the penalty will not be added to Participant B's fund.  
 
After Participant B decides whether or not to implement a control system, you will be 
notified of this decision.  
 









Your Summary of Points 
 
You will receive an initial fund of 1000 points. From this fund, you will pay for the 10 
shares you have selected (10 points for each BELL share and 25 points for each 
WHISTLE share). Further, the points will depend on whether or not Participant B chose 
to implement a control system and, if a control system has been implemented, the total 
return of the shares chosen by you. Thus the payoffs to you for this initial decision are as 
follows:  
  
    No Control System Control System 
Total Share Returns 
 < 500  
1000 points - Cost of 
Shares 
 
1000 points - Cost of Shares - 150 
penalty points 
  
Total Share Returns  >= 
500  
1000 points - Cost of 
Shares 
 
1000 points - Cost of Shares  
  
 
For example, suppose Participant B implements the control system and you choose 6 
BELL shares and 4 WHISTLE shares.  Also assume that the returns for these investments 
are less than 500 points. Your payoff will equal 1000 - (6 x 10) - (4 x 25) - 150 = 690 
points.  
  
If Participant B does not implement the control system or the returns for the investments 








Participant B will receive the total return from the 10 (ten) shares chosen by 
you. Participant B will have the opportunity to implement a control system prior to your 
investment decision. The control system, if implemented, establishes a penalty 
system for you.  
 











Summary of Points - Participant B 
  
The total number of points that Participant B earns will depend on the total return of the 
shares chosen by you, and whether or not Participant B chose to implement a control 







Returns < 500  
250 points + total 
share returns 
250 points + total share returns - 50 
points for cost of control system 
Total Share 
Returns >=500 
250 points + total 
share returns 
250 points + total share returns - 50 




Please click the "Next" button to continue.  
Penalty No Discretion Choose Investments 
Please wait to see whether Participant B has chosen to implement a control system. Your 
computer will go to a different screen when Participant B responds.  While you are 
waiting, please take a few moments to review the graphical representations of the 
investment histories for the possible investments.  
Participant B HAS imposed a control system that penalizes you 150 points if your 
investments yield a return < 500 points.  
 
Your task is to choose 10 investment projects to invest in from the 30 
investments.  Please review the graphical representations of the investment histories for 
the possible investments. Then write down your 10 selections using the provided paper 
and pencil.   
 
After you click the "Next" button, you will have the opportunity to enter your selections.   
 





Please select 10 investment projects to invest in from the 30 investments listed below. To 
see the entire list of projects, please scroll down until you see the "Next" button. When 
you are finished, please click the "Next" button. 
 
 
  BELL (10 points each)                                             WHISTLE (25 points each) 
 
Investment Project A 
 
Investment Project P 
 
Investment Project B 
 
Investment Project Q 
 
Investment Project C 
 
Investment Project R 
 
Investment Project D 
 
Investment Project S 
 
Investment Project E 
 
Investment Project T 
 
Investment Project F 
 
Investment Project U 
 
Investment Project G 
 
Investment Project V 
 
Investment Project H 
 
Investment Project W 
 
Investment Project I 
 
Investment Project X 
 
Investment Project J 
 
Investment Project Y 
 
Investment Project K 
 
Investment Project Z 
 
Investment Project L 
 
Investment Project AA 
 
Investment Project M 
 
Investment Project BB 
 
Investment Project N 
 
Investment Project CC 
 
Investment Project O 
 









As a first step, you will have the task of selecting a portfolio of investments for 
Participant B. That is, Participant B will earn the returns from the portfolio, but you will 
choose the specific investments to be included in the portfolio. You will also pay for the 
investments, but will be given a fund from which to pay.  
  
More specifically, at the start of the study,  
 You will be given 1000 points and  
 Participant B will be given 250 points.   
Your initial fund is larger because you must pay for the investments and Participant B 
will receive the returns from the investments.  
  
The following instructions will describe in detail the decisions made by you and 
Participant B.  
 
 




You have the task of selecting the portfolio of investments. You will be presented with 
30 possible investments. From these 30 investment choices, you must select and pay for 
1 share each of 10 of these investments, which will earn points for Participant 
B. Participant B will hold the shares for one period only and so Participant B's returns 
will be maximized if you select the 10 shares that are expected to make the highest 
returns in the next period.   
  
NOTE: You must select 10 different investments and buy exactly one share each 











There are two types of investments, BELL investments and WHISTLE investments.  The 
cost per share depends on the investment type.  
 Each BELL share selected will cost you 10 points.  
 Each WHISTLE share selected will cost you 25 points.  
WHISTLE shares are more expensive because on average they are expected to return 
more per share in the next period than BELL shares. Specifically, BELL shares will earn 
an average return of 20 points per share, whereas WHISTLE shares will earn an average 
return of 50 points per share.  
  
Importantly, this is only an average and any individual investment can earn considerably 
more or less than the average (as you can see by looking at the graphical representations 
of the investment return history which are provided to you on the large, folded documents 
and described on the laminated document next to your keyboard).  
  
Please take a moment to review the laminated document. Click the "Next" button after 
you have read the information on the laminated document.  
  
Participant B will have the opportunity to implement the control system prior to your 
investment decision. The control system establishes a penalty system for you in which 
you will pay 150 points if the total return of all shares chosen by you is less than 
the performance target set by Participant B (between 400 - 600 points). You will not 
have to pay any penalty points if the total return is greater than or equal to the 
performance target set by Participant B. The penalty will be paid to the administrator's 
fund. That is, the penalty will not be added to Participant B's fund.  
 









Your Summary of Points 
  
You will receive an initial fund of 1000 points. From this fund, you will pay for the 10 
shares you have selected (10 points for each BELL share and 25 points for each 
WHISTLE share). Further, the points will depend on whether or not Participant B chose 
to implement a control system and, if a control system has been implemented, the total 
return of the shares chosen by you. Thus the payoffs to you for this initial decision are as 
follows:  
  
  No Control System Control System 
Total Share Returns < Target set by 
Participant B 
 (between 400 - 600 points)  
 1000 points - Cost 
of Shares 
 
1000 points - Cost of Shares - 
150 penalty points 
  
Total Share Returns >= Target set 
by Participant B 
 (between 400 - 600 points)  
 1000 points - Cost 
of Shares 
 
1000 points - Cost of Shares  
  
 
For example, suppose Participant B implements the control system and you choose 6 
BELL shares and 4 WHISTLE shares.  Also assume that the returns for these investments 
are less than the performance target set by Participant B.  Your payoff will equal 1000 - 
(6 x 10) - (4 x 25) - 150 = 690 points.  
  
If Participant B does not implement the control system or the returns for the investments 
equal or exceed the performance target set by Participant B, your payoff will equal 1000 - 
(6 x 10) - (4 x 25) = 840 points.  
 
 




Participant B will receive the total return from the 10 (ten) shares chosen by 
you.  Participant B will have the opportunity to implement a control system prior to your 
investment decision. The control system, if implemented, establishes a penalty 
system for you.  
 













Summary of Points - Participant B 
  
The total number of points that Participant B earns will depend on the total return of the 
shares chosen by you, and whether or not Participant B chose to implement a control 






Total Share Returns < Target 
set by Participant B (between 
400 - 600 points) 
250 points + 
total share 
returns 
250 points + total share 
returns - 50 points for cost 
of control system 
Total Share Returns >= Target 
set by Participant B (between 
400 - 600 points) 
250 points + 
total share 
returns 
250 points + total share 
returns - 50 points for cost 




Please click the "Next" button to continue. 
  
Penalty Discretion Choose Investments 
Please wait to see whether Participant B has chosen to implement a control system. Your 
computer will go to a different screen when Participant B responds. While you are 
waiting, please take a few moments to review the graphical representations of the 
investment histories for the possible investments.  
Participant B HAS imposed a control system that penalizes you 150 points if your 
investments yield < the performance target set by Participant B (between 400 - 600 
points).  
 
Your task is to choose 10 investment projects to invest in from the 30 
investments.  Please review the graphical representations of the investment histories for 
the possible investments. Then write down your 10 selections using the provided paper 
and pencil.   
 
After you click the "Next" button, you will have the opportunity to enter your selections.   
 




Please select 10 investment projects to invest in from the 30 investments listed below. To 
see the entire list of projects, please scroll down until you see the "Next" button. When 
you are finished, please click the "Next" button. 
    
       BELL (10 points each)                                             WHISTLE (25 points each) 
 
Investment Project A 
 
Investment Project P 
 
Investment Project B 
 
Investment Project Q 
 
Investment Project C 
 
Investment Project R 
 
Investment Project D 
 
Investment Project S 
 
Investment Project E 
 
Investment Project T 
 
Investment Project F 
 
Investment Project U 
 
Investment Project G 
 
Investment Project V 
 
Investment Project H 
 
Investment Project W 
 
Investment Project I 
 
Investment Project X 
 
Investment Project J 
 
Investment Project Y 
 
Investment Project K 
 
Investment Project Z 
 
Investment Project L 
 
Investment Project AA 
 
Investment Project M 
 
Investment Project BB 
 
Investment Project N 
 
Investment Project CC 
 
Investment Project O 
 










You are still in the same role.  
 
In addition, you are paired with the same person. The identification of participants will 
continue to be anonymous throughout the study.  
 
You will start this part with whatever points you have in your fund following the prior set 
of decisions. (Note that you do not know the amount exactly, because we have not told 
you the returns from the shares you have selected.  However, you still have a minimum of 
600 points with which to make investments.) 
 
You will now have the opportunity to earn more points based on the choices made by you 
and the person with whom you are paired.  
 
 
Please click the "Next" button to continue. 
   
Your Task 
  
You now have the task of deciding on one additional investment for Participant B. This 
investment decision is different from the prior investment decisions in several important 
ways:  
There is only one type of investment: a HORN investment. 
Each HORN share costs 10 points (whereas in prior decisions, some investments cost 10 
points and some cost 25 points).  
119 
 
The return per share in the next period is known to be 30 points (whereas in the prior 
decisions, the return per share in the next period was unknown and had to be predicted 
based on the history of past returns). 
You can purchase anywhere from 0 to 50 shares of the HORN investment (whereas in the 
prior decisions, you could only select one share each of 10 different investments). 
Participant B will earn the returns from the portfolio. However, Participant B will have 
the opportunity to share the return from the investment with you (whereas in the prior 
decisions, Participant B kept the total return).   
  
Please click the "Next" button to continue.  
Participant B 
 
After learning how many shares you have purchased, Participant B will be given the 
opportunity to pay any amount of the return to you.  Remember that Participant B will 
earn 30 points for each HORN share that you purchase.   
 
 
After Participant B earns the return, Participant B will decide how much of the total 
return to give back to you. Participant B can return to you anything from 0 to the total 
amount. 
 
Please click the "Next" button to continue.   
 
Task 2 Treatment 
You have at least 600 points remaining from Part 1.  
  
You can now purchase between 0 - 50 shares of the HORN Investment.  Each share of 




Each share of the HORN Investment automatically returns 30 points.  Participant B will 
earn all of the returns from the shares of HORN Investment that you buy.   
  
However, Participant B can share any amount of the returns with you.  
  
Please move the slider along the bar below with your mouse to indicate how many shares 
of the HORN investment you would like to buy. After you are finished, please click the 
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